1 2013-03-08 00:00:02 <gmaxwell> PRab: 0.00008 BTC for 250 bytes was some numbers gavin came up with: https://gist.github.com/gavinandresen/5044482
2 2013-03-08 00:00:07 <OneMiner> gmaxwell I'd like to hamper SD in novel and effective ways. I've considered proramming literacy before. I think it could be good to add something like that to public schools. But I'm obviously not one to comment as I can't program anything past a .bat file or uber simple html.
3 2013-03-08 00:00:23 <warren> gmaxwell: is there any legitimate reason for normal, non-DP's to spend a 0-conf tx?
4 2013-03-08 00:01:03 <warren> gmaxwell: that's a different question from yesterday, about accepting 0-conf
5 2013-03-08 00:01:05 <PRab> gmaxwell: +1, Thats exactly what I was looking for!
6 2013-03-08 00:01:06 <gmaxwell> warren: normal nodes do it for their own change, although arguably they shouldn't because it exposes them to getting stuck transactions due to mutation and also deanonymizes their change.
7 2013-03-08 00:01:25 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Gavin's numbers are silly though; the most efficient miner isn't the one that hashes blocks and processes transactions efficiently, it's the miner who does that while remaining small and independent.
8 2013-03-08 00:02:17 <OneMiner> BTW
9 2013-03-08 00:02:26 <petertodd> Not to say his result is wrong, but the premise for why he's calculating it is.
10 2013-03-08 00:02:26 <warren> gmaxwell: Would there be any drawback to increasing the fee for spending a 0-conf? That would catch any mutation of DP behavior that we disapprove of.
11 2013-03-08 00:02:48 <OneMiner> ACTION stabs aethero with a half chewed table leg
12 2013-03-08 00:02:59 <aethero> Half chewed?
13 2013-03-08 00:03:02 <gmaxwell> warren: yes. its not very economically sensible. We already have a increased 'fee' in the sense that priority is much lower for those txn.
14 2013-03-08 00:03:23 <warren> sorry, I'm sure somebody already thought of this.
15 2013-03-08 00:03:29 <OneMiner> ...
16 2013-03-08 00:03:32 <gmaxwell> warren: but the problem is that once someone is paying a fee how do you balance _any_ kind of preference other than btc/kb against the immediate economic reward of the fee?
17 2013-03-08 00:03:43 <warren> I just see blocking 1dice is futile, we need an agnostic rule-based change.
18 2013-03-08 00:04:03 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Ok, so basically, has anyone come up with a decent scheme making creating a lot of UTXO's more expensive than not?
19 2013-03-08 00:04:07 <gmaxwell> warren: actually no one suggested specifically 0 confirm, and I think it's interesting but it generally falls into the same problem that all preferences have.
20 2013-03-08 00:04:10 <petertodd> gmaxwell: One that gives stable incentives for miners.
21 2013-03-08 00:04:14 <OneMiner> Ok, I guess it's good for me.
22 2013-03-08 00:04:20 <OneMiner> ACTION learns to compile
23 2013-03-08 00:04:45 <gmaxwell> petertodd: hardfork to change to a maximum blocksize of 2MB with a maximum utxo increase of 1MB. :(
24 2013-03-08 00:04:53 <aethero> oneMiner: Good for you?
25 2013-03-08 00:05:01 <gmaxwell> petertodd: that gives you a stable incentive. Nothing else does, I think. :(
26 2013-03-08 00:05:08 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Hmm... well, at least it's a good idea. <sigh>
27 2013-03-08 00:05:24 <OneMiner> ACTION feuds with aethero
28 2013-03-08 00:05:30 <aethero> :(
29 2013-03-08 00:05:39 <OneMiner> :(?
30 2013-03-08 00:05:49 <aethero> Feuds?
31 2013-03-08 00:05:53 <warren> gmaxwell: Meanwhile, the compressed keys thing, yes you can only enforce it on redeeming, but it still increases their cost without any actual drawbacks to the network.
32 2013-03-08 00:06:01 <gmaxwell> petertodd: the problem with _any_ ideas around priortizing good behavior is that they potentially are at odds with maximizing income for miners... unless they are fees per KB, because KB is the scarce thing.
33 2013-03-08 00:06:01 <petertodd> gmaxwell: I know block discouraging has been proposed in the past, but it seems extremely dangerous without very widespread support to me.
34 2013-03-08 00:06:17 <gmaxwell> petertodd: discouraging is extremely dangerous.
35 2013-03-08 00:06:32 <aethero> ACTION is trying to abstract this entire conversation and having absolutely zero luck
36 2013-03-08 00:06:45 <gmaxwell> warren: if people find it more economical to abandon more txouts that more perpetual storage in fast memory.
37 2013-03-08 00:06:54 <OneMiner> I've gotta read complex stuff now. :P
38 2013-03-08 00:07:01 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Yup. And miners aren't going to be happy about soft-forks working against them, although maybe we have a window now where the big pools are big enough... but I suspect we'd very quickly find the miners at those pools creating their own.
39 2013-03-08 00:07:06 <warren> gmaxwell: attaching a higher fee to undesireable behavior isn't necessarily worse for miners. For the undesireable behavior to continue, they need to pay a higher fee to have the same priority as before. Miners might like that.
40 2013-03-08 00:07:40 <aethero> Who gets to define undesireable?
41 2013-03-08 00:07:42 <petertodd> warren: Hey, why do you think stopping puppies is so hard?
42 2013-03-08 00:07:44 <gmaxwell> warren: it has a high risk of defection. As a miner you hope all other miners impose that, changing the behavior, while you yourself do not.
43 2013-03-08 00:08:15 <petertodd> aethero: That too. The difficulty in even censoring satoshidice does have a silver lining to it.
44 2013-03-08 00:08:24 <gmaxwell> aethero: pretty sure one user using 90% of the network's capacity is undesirable regardless of how you define undesirable.
45 2013-03-08 00:08:35 <aethero> gmaxwell are the miners getting paid?
46 2013-03-08 00:08:52 <warren> petertodd: miners who exclude DP tx's give up fees, and DP really doesn't care *when* the tx becomes confirmed. It will happen eventually by another miner seeking maximum fees.
47 2013-03-08 00:08:53 <petertodd> aethero: Yes
48 2013-03-08 00:09:09 <gmaxwell> aethero: Paid for what? Thats key. Including a transaction implies pepetual storage... for not just you but everyone.
49 2013-03-08 00:09:23 <petertodd> warren: Yeah, the only really solid way to discourage them is to start mining double-spends.
50 2013-03-08 00:09:35 <warren> petertodd: that doesn't hurt the DP
51 2013-03-08 00:09:42 <aethero> Define DP
52 2013-03-08 00:09:54 <gmaxwell> Dead-puppies.
53 2013-03-08 00:09:58 <warren> yeah.
54 2013-03-08 00:10:01 <gmaxwell> (obviously)
55 2013-03-08 00:10:03 <petertodd> aethero: DP == dead puppies == the thing that's taking up 75% of the blockchain space
56 2013-03-08 00:10:15 <aethero> what are dead puppies?
57 2013-03-08 00:10:25 <petertodd> warren: It does if those miners make it easy for people to double-spend their failed bets.
58 2013-03-08 00:10:36 <warren> Isn't it already easy?
59 2013-03-08 00:10:46 <petertodd> aethero: Pick a random transaction and I'll tell you if it's a dead puppy.
60 2013-03-08 00:10:53 <aethero> How?
61 2013-03-08 00:10:55 <warren> It isn't certain now, but it is reasonably easy.
62 2013-03-08 00:10:59 <aethero> What *is* a dp?
63 2013-03-08 00:11:09 <petertodd> aethero: Just pick one off of blockchain.info transaction live ticker
64 2013-03-08 00:11:22 <aethero> What differentiates a DP from a legit txn?
65 2013-03-08 00:11:33 <petertodd> warren: You don't see miners making it easy though do you?
66 2013-03-08 00:11:37 <aethero> http://blockchain.info/tx/780c9cd02696e390c52ab9f73be3178a9294696922475c62e46d4bc0b9c379bc
67 2013-03-08 00:11:40 <warren> aethero: high fees, 0-conf response payout
68 2013-03-08 00:11:55 <petertodd> aethero: Not a dead puppy
69 2013-03-08 00:12:15 <petertodd> warren: To make it easy, write a patch enabling transaction replacement purely by fees.
70 2013-03-08 00:12:31 <aethero> http://blockchain.info/tx/f95d79ebc274b51cb2abcee19c91473a94e05ba76e50fc5b8c393d7f66cb06fd?
71 2013-03-08 00:12:48 <petertodd> aethero: dead puppy
72 2013-03-08 00:13:03 <aethero> http://blockchain.info/tx/04e15cafae29f72bb3cba6710800812062fa28e5f4dc18083c0015d49feaaafb ?
73 2013-03-08 00:13:17 <petertodd> aethero: not a dead puppy
74 2013-03-08 00:13:54 <aethero> http://blockchain.info/tx/bef7e388e9dbfc4873a1a6ad5746c1f34b7915a1193567baeb57fb33d9b72a65
75 2013-03-08 00:13:56 <aethero> last one
76 2013-03-08 00:14:12 <warren> petertodd: ok, sorry, I misunderstood an aspect of yesterday.
77 2013-03-08 00:14:18 <petertodd> aethero: another dead puppy
78 2013-03-08 00:14:21 <aethero> Ok
79 2013-03-08 00:14:36 <gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: gimme an address and I'll hand over the 1BTC bounty. :P
80 2013-03-08 00:14:51 <petertodd> (god help us if the media finds out about how many dead puppies are in bitcoin)
81 2013-03-08 00:15:18 <warren> petertodd: we could use a temporary bubble pop
82 2013-03-08 00:15:35 <warren> You know how they say there isn't a central banker here...
83 2013-03-08 00:15:41 <gmaxwell> s/media/US congress/
84 2013-03-08 00:16:04 <iwilcox> Have SD never responded on this issue?
85 2013-03-08 00:16:12 <petertodd> aethero: because random
86 2013-03-08 00:16:20 <gmaxwell> if someone can point to blocks with 90% DP they may have an easy time arguing that there is no substantial lawful use of the network. :(
87 2013-03-08 00:16:32 <petertodd> gmaxwell: s/US congress/
88 2013-03-08 00:16:37 <petertodd> North Korea/
89 2013-03-08 00:16:53 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Yes, that's a very good reason...
90 2013-03-08 00:16:58 <warren> iwilcox: we call it DP now. The imagery makes it feel worse.
91 2013-03-08 00:16:59 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Good reason to ban address re-use too
92 2013-03-08 00:17:40 <HM> DP?
93 2013-03-08 00:17:48 <gmaxwell> HM: see backscroll.
94 2013-03-08 00:17:56 <HM> Dead puppy
95 2013-03-08 00:18:04 <HM> I don't know what that is
96 2013-03-08 00:18:22 <aethero> Double Purpose.
97 2013-03-08 00:18:43 <HM> what does that mean?
98 2013-03-08 00:18:54 <aethero> Deep Pinging.
99 2013-03-08 00:19:33 <petertodd> gmaxwell: RE the puppy patch, someone needs to submit a pull request for the dust part of it.
100 2013-03-08 00:19:34 <warren> http://pastebin.com/ng9nF4K3
101 2013-03-08 00:19:49 <Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: 181SdgXpsnvXjALGAy8Hq3yqJmBBNouJGb, but you don't have to :p
102 2013-03-08 00:20:13 <gmaxwell> petertodd: ugh. It gives us YET ANOTHER economically sensitive tunable parameter.
103 2013-03-08 00:20:40 <petertodd> Meh, it's the same logic as the fee code; just make it only act on zero-priority tx's.
104 2013-03-08 00:22:37 <gmaxwell> petertodd: so respin jeff's patch that makes DUST a define and make it < DUST, so at least it's not more parameter bloat?
105 2013-03-08 00:22:52 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Sure
106 2013-03-08 00:27:05 <gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: I sent you half. Other half goes to my legal defense fund as a finders fee. :P
107 2013-03-08 00:27:40 <Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: hmm, I received two transactions of 0.25 BTC and 0.50 BTC. you only sent one of these? O.o
108 2013-03-08 00:28:12 <petertodd> Luke-Jr: If you've been following the pull-reqs, I'm sure some analysis will let you figure out who sent you the other one.
109 2013-03-08 00:28:39 <Luke-Jr> ACTION ponders
110 2013-03-08 00:29:32 <gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: right I sent 529f4a6354c28fa8e02a5a70f6cf8908698b3399dc484f37c4a904593bd948e7.
111 2013-03-08 00:32:59 <petertodd> Luke-Jr: <sigh> so much for my cautionary tale
112 2013-03-08 00:33:09 <Luke-Jr> ?
113 2013-03-08 00:33:40 <petertodd> "locktime" : 224764, "sequence" : 4294967294, I'm likely the only Bitcoin users running a patch that does that.
114 2013-03-08 00:33:56 <petertodd> Long story short: if your client's behavior is unusual, your anonymity is compromised.
115 2013-03-08 00:35:56 <phantomcircuit> heh you're worried about anonymity
116 2013-03-08 00:36:00 <Luke-Jr> ^
117 2013-03-08 00:36:17 <warren> How is a few people deciding to ignore certain tx's going to help the situation?
118 2013-03-08 00:36:19 <phantomcircuit> there are a number of people running clients which almost certainly break the fundamental rules in some bizarre corner case
119 2013-03-08 00:36:31 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: I obviously can't be *that* worried....
120 2013-03-08 00:36:45 <phantomcircuit> petertodd, :)
121 2013-03-08 00:37:35 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: But it's a fair design criteria for protocols, for instance trust-free-mixer transactions can be either done in a "probably a mix tx" way, with SIGHASH_ALL, or a "definitely a mix" way, with SIGHASH_ANYONECANPAY
122 2013-03-08 00:38:19 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: Not to mention, you guys now do know I have at least 20BTC...
123 2013-03-08 00:38:36 <phantomcircuit> petertodd, so you're poor?
124 2013-03-08 00:38:40 <phantomcircuit> ;)
125 2013-03-08 00:38:51 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: Depends on who you ask. :P
126 2013-03-08 00:39:16 <phantomcircuit> anyways
127 2013-03-08 00:39:48 <phantomcircuit> even basic attempts at disguising the origin of bitcoins on the network would be computationally challenging to detect
128 2013-03-08 00:40:25 <petertodd> ...until some yells "Thief!" and declares some coins tainted.
129 2013-03-08 00:40:56 <phantomcircuit> petertodd, i have yet to hear of a since incident in which tracing coins in the blackchain resulted in anything
130 2013-03-08 00:41:17 <phantomcircuit> and infact i suspect overtime as people use overlay networks more it will become even harder
131 2013-03-08 00:41:22 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: I've heard a few. More importantly, the efforts applied to actually do that so far have been pretty week.
132 2013-03-08 00:41:29 <petertodd> *weak
133 2013-03-08 00:41:39 <phantomcircuit> especially when you consider that such an overlay network could operate completely anonymously and outside the reach of any law enforcement
134 2013-03-08 00:41:51 <phantomcircuit> petertodd, public cases?
135 2013-03-08 00:42:05 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: Yes, all where people have messed up and sent coins to the wrong place.
136 2013-03-08 00:42:10 <petertodd> Or high fees.
137 2013-03-08 00:42:12 <phantomcircuit> i've heard of peoples mtgox accounts being frozen but not of people who actually did anything
138 2013-03-08 00:42:42 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: Anyway, with the way authority these days works, they don't need proof, just probability, that's what's so dangerous about it.
139 2013-03-08 00:42:59 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: Prosecuters just need to convince a jury after all.
140 2013-03-08 00:44:41 <phantomcircuit> petertodd, yes but to convince the jury they must first find someone to put on trial
141 2013-03-08 00:45:29 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: ...and god help you if they find some flimsy evidence that finds the wrong person, backed up by a blockchain taint analysis that's fundementally flawed.
142 2013-03-08 00:45:46 <phantomcircuit> petertodd, hmm that might be true
143 2013-03-08 00:45:56 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: Potentially it could make holding Bitcoins dangerous in itself.
144 2013-03-08 00:46:22 <phantomcircuit> then again such a prosecution is only really within reach of the doj and realistically if they charge you with something you're going to jail or spending millions on attorneys
145 2013-03-08 00:46:29 <phantomcircuit> so you're probably screwed bitcoins or not
146 2013-03-08 00:47:13 <gmaxwell> This is one of the reasons I created that taint rich thread. It's not enough that it be true that taint analysis is a multilayered joke, it has to be widely understood??? or you get maximally bad outcomes: not just bad people getting caught for bad things due to taint analysis (whoppie as far as I care!) but innocent people being falsely accused too.
147 2013-03-08 00:47:21 <petertodd> phantomcircuit: It's not a black and white thing. Prosecuters are people too, and they very often believe that they are doing the right thing, they just aren't going about it correctly.
148 2013-03-08 00:47:52 <petertodd> You know, we're lucky that trust-free mixing happens to be more efficient size wise, thus reducing fees.
149 2013-03-08 00:48:03 <petertodd> Who said you are trying to mix coins? We're just saving on fees.
150 2013-03-08 00:48:54 <gmaxwell> Keep in mind that most _doctors_ fail a simple word problem on reasoning over prior probabilities. If doctors can't handle it how do you expect prosecuters, courts, or juries to manage it?
151 2013-03-08 00:50:16 <petertodd> One of the things I really like about off-chain tx systems, is they get back to at least the level of privacy normal financial transactions give you.
152 2013-03-08 00:51:27 <warren> I need to figure out how to make the deterministic build without Ubuntu...
153 2013-03-08 00:52:04 <aethero> Here's an idea
154 2013-03-08 00:52:04 <sipa> warren: run it in a virtual machine with ubuntu :)
155 2013-03-08 00:52:07 <aethero> DONT DO ANYTHING ILLEGAL
156 2013-03-08 00:52:36 <phantomcircuit> aethero, the point is you could end up in jail for something you didn't do because of bad analysis
157 2013-03-08 00:52:46 <petertodd> aethero: Read what I said. The issue isn't just you doing something illegal, it's someone else doing something illegal and you taking the blame due to misunderstood evidence.
158 2013-03-08 00:53:47 <aethero> Can you give me an example of that?
159 2013-03-08 00:54:50 <petertodd> aethero: A thief steals some BTC, and makes a transaction sending money to a randomly picked address. You don't notice the transaction, spend it, and are now blamed.
160 2013-03-08 00:56:10 <gmaxwell> Even if a conviction is not secured misunderstanding of the evidence causes your home to get searched and your computers seized, your business fails in the interm.
161 2013-03-08 00:58:38 <warren> gmaxwell: Would something like this be acceptable to bitcoin upstream: a way to configure your bitcoind node to ignore certain tx's from your .conf instead of rebuilding the daemon. That's agnostic and voluntary enough.
162 2013-03-08 00:58:51 <aethero> Sounds like scare tactics
163 2013-03-08 00:58:52 <gmaxwell> or alternatively, someone helps you out on IRC you want to send them 1BTC as thanks. They give you an address. You send. Turns out that the address was some FBI childporn honeypot. They find you from some forum linked address, and now have proof that 'you' paid for child porn.
164 2013-03-08 00:59:26 <gmaxwell> warren: I'm really not very comfortable with that. The idea that you have to be savvy/motivated enough to recompile creates a natural barrier against overly illconsidered actions.
165 2013-03-08 00:59:49 <gmaxwell> warren: if people are going to adopt weird policy then they should realy mean it, and really understand it... failing that someone who is an expert should really understand it.
166 2013-03-08 01:00:07 <jrmithdobbs> I agree with that
167 2013-03-08 01:00:15 <PRab> Just playing around with my own "back of a napkin" calculations for expected profitability at different block sizes.
168 2013-03-08 01:00:17 <PRab> https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/ccc?key=0Ap8b8Fy33rWmdHh1WEpwNjhGNExlc29PWjVjdTJ5enc&usp=sharing
169 2013-03-08 01:00:33 <jrmithdobbs> even though recompiling isn't a very large barrier it's large enough to prevent completely unqualified people from shooting themselves in the foot
170 2013-03-08 01:00:33 <warren> gmaxwell: while I personally want to block certain things, we're in the extreme minority, will our choice make any difference to success of abuse?
171 2013-03-08 01:00:43 <Luke-Jr> gmaxwell: otoh, some p2pool miners are still accepting SD crap because nobody has made an EXE for them
172 2013-03-08 01:00:45 <petertodd> PRab: can you add units to that?
173 2013-03-08 01:01:25 <PRab> petertodd: yep, some of the columns already have notes if you hover over the header.
174 2013-03-08 01:01:26 <gmaxwell> Luke-Jr: thats something that might make more sense within smaller communities. E.g. I don't mind making binaries for IRC channel people who know me and can ask me about them. (though I prefer they build)
175 2013-03-08 01:01:46 <petertodd> PRab: oh, better, although it's more readable in the headers
176 2013-03-08 01:02:09 <jgarzik> This post by satoshi was dug up by the reddit folks
177 2013-03-08 01:02:11 <jgarzik> http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg09964.html
178 2013-03-08 01:02:12 <petertodd> PRab: max block size is 1,000,000 exact
179 2013-03-08 01:02:15 <gmaxwell> PRab: pretty cool. I'm glad to see that... uh. you're not a fool.
180 2013-03-08 01:03:01 <PRab> petertodd: oh, I was assuming binary MB, not decimal.
181 2013-03-08 01:03:17 <petertodd> PRab: No worries, I was making that mistake for weeks...
182 2013-03-08 01:03:29 <PRab> gmaxwell: I've been thinking about it quite a bit and wanted to at least get something concrete.
183 2013-03-08 01:03:51 <petertodd> jgarzik: ...gah, satoshi was a man, not a god.
184 2013-03-08 01:04:15 <sipa> jgarzik: i saw that; very interesting that he thought about that
185 2013-03-08 01:04:24 <petertodd> jgarzik: I mean, fuck, I found an off-by-one mistake he made the other day; to think he could somehow predict in advance the right way every aspect of Bitcoin would develop is crazy.
186 2013-03-08 01:04:41 <Luke-Jr> petertodd: it does show some foresight in the design at least
187 2013-03-08 01:04:43 <sipa> though i'm not sure i agree with the idea that only miners would run fully validating nodes...
188 2013-03-08 01:05:09 <gmaxwell> sipa: I think we've noted before: he seemed to have fairly high expectations of the honesty of miners.
189 2013-03-08 01:05:14 <petertodd> Luke-Jr: Oh sure, I mean it's good to be thinking about that, I'm just only going to take emails like that as a way to understand why the design is, not as some "proof" that his approach is right.
190 2013-03-08 01:05:24 <sipa> i wasn't aware he thought about scalability to that extent; knowing that he did is interesting, whether he is right or not
191 2013-03-08 01:05:53 <petertodd> Luke-Jr: Note how he doesn't say how many full verifying nodes he expects to exist...
192 2013-03-08 01:06:06 <sipa> yeah "should be safe"
193 2013-03-08 01:06:14 <petertodd> Luke-Jr: Just vague stuff about "specialists"
194 2013-03-08 01:06:33 <gmaxwell> Well it was a vague response to a vague concern. Order of magnitude stuff.
195 2013-03-08 01:06:44 <Luke-Jr> it's clear he expected transaction volume to scale with adoption - so back to SD being disproportionate.. :p
196 2013-03-08 01:07:51 <gmaxwell> Yea, the disproportionate thing was interesting. If we really had the txn volume to fill blocks now the economy would be big enough to have a lot more seriously smart and productive people working on solving things.
197 2013-03-08 01:08:03 <iwilcox> Apologies if I've just started listening to the end of a very long discussion on this, but is the current proposal in a nutshell: here's an anti-DP patch; include it in your client if you like?
198 2013-03-08 01:08:10 <gmaxwell> And fewer people worried that the chain was taking 6GB.
199 2013-03-08 01:08:24 <gmaxwell> iwilcox: huh? there is no proposal.
200 2013-03-08 01:08:52 <warren> Hence I asked yesterday if anyone is making a list of different approaches to this problem.
201 2013-03-08 01:09:05 <jgarzik> petertodd: Frankly I do not think Satoshi had any more wisdom than us, about bitcoin long term.
202 2013-03-08 01:09:16 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Instead we have a guy with a fine arts degree and a guy with a highschool diploma trying to figure out how to make Bitcoin scale...
203 2013-03-08 01:09:20 <QwertyYouEyeOp> hey guys, anyone here able to give me a hand with accessing bitcoin channels on freenode through Tor browser?? having some technical difficulties!
204 2013-03-08 01:09:22 <gmaxwell> iwilcox: someone on the forum asked for a patch that blocks the relay of DP txn, I tossed one up for them. I certantly am not going and advising people to run it. (though if they do I'll give them tech support for it... and I do run it myself)
205 2013-03-08 01:09:35 <petertodd> jgarzik: Yeah, really, who could?
206 2013-03-08 01:09:43 <jgarzik> These two positions are almost mutually exclusive: (1) block sizes much increase to meet traffic demand, (2) transaction fees will increase and support the system long term
207 2013-03-08 01:09:54 <jgarzik> block sizes increase, there is less demand for space
208 2013-03-08 01:10:09 <jgarzik> s/much/must/
209 2013-03-08 01:10:34 <gmaxwell> jgarzik: Now if you can just find an expression of that which more people even understand. It's so frustrating that people don't even get that this is a hard problem with serious risks involved.
210 2013-03-08 01:10:44 <petertodd> Yes, although it'll be intereting to see how the trade-offs with off-chain tx systems work; do they become successful enough that on-chain tx's are actually still cheapish?
211 2013-03-08 01:10:56 <gmaxwell> I'm _really_ getting tired of my position being mischaracterized as "the blocksize can never increase!"
212 2013-03-08 01:11:04 <petertodd> Same here.
213 2013-03-08 01:11:25 <petertodd> The issue isn't really blocksize, it's do we expect the majority of economic activity for users to happen on-chain or off-chain?
214 2013-03-08 01:11:41 <jgarzik> I disagree we should bother answering that question
215 2013-03-08 01:11:43 <petertodd> If it's on-chain, the blocksize has to increase, potentially dramatically.
216 2013-03-08 01:11:48 <jgarzik> Ultimately time and miners will answer the question
217 2013-03-08 01:11:52 <gmaxwell> But people characterize it that way because I am unable to express my several-facitied concerns in a way that everyone can understand, and so they are just left assuming that I hate change.
218 2013-03-08 01:12:32 <petertodd> jgarzik: That's not realistic though. People will complain to hell, someone will release a version of Bitcoin that increases the limit, and god knows what will happen.
219 2013-03-08 01:12:49 <petertodd> jgarzik: After all, miners can't force any change really, but they can veto it.
220 2013-03-08 01:12:50 <aethero> recompiling?
221 2013-03-08 01:12:55 <warren> ary tx fees.
222 2013-03-08 01:12:55 <warren> jgarzik: I personally am unsatisfied with a fee charge only on KB-size, and this is a way to attack the problem without your #1 or #2. There must exist certain fee preferences beyond merely per-KB size that apply only to DP-like tx's with little effect on normal uses, e.g. double the fee per KB for a tx that spends a 0-conf or to redeem a non-compressed key. Miners might accept that because it implies higher fees, without an arms race of ordin
223 2013-03-08 01:12:57 <gmaxwell> jgarzik: miners do not own bitcoin, the users of bitcoin do. If you let "miners decide" on anything you disenfranchise everyone who didn't sign up for what miners are deciding.
224 2013-03-08 01:13:00 <QwertyYouEyeOp> is anyone here able to help someone new with some technical issues?? please!
225 2013-03-08 01:13:04 <aethero> Defin recompiling
226 2013-03-08 01:13:29 <gmaxwell> QwertyYouEyeOp: try asking in #freenode. ... freenode is very unfriendly towards anonymous access. :(
227 2013-03-08 01:13:45 <gmaxwell> (you can use tor, but only if you deanonymize yourself first)
228 2013-03-08 01:14:05 <QwertyYouEyeOp> i see. so i'm not missing something, then, with trying to stay anonymous?
229 2013-03-08 01:14:12 <sipa> jgarzik: i don't like thinking about fees, i'm no economist and making long term economic predictions is hard - but i don't think i need to: if block sizes are (extremely) small, noone will make on-chain transactions, but everyone will verify them; if block sizes are (extremely) large, everyone will make on-chain transactions, but nobody will verify them; neither is a useful future imho, so just to avoid the risk on the second, i think block sizes...
230 2013-03-08 01:14:18 <sipa> must not be allowed to grow unboundedly
231 2013-03-08 01:15:24 <jgarzik> sipa: that's why I like the simple rule mentioned in earlier discussions (limit += 1MB per year or something)
232 2013-03-08 01:15:35 <petertodd> sipa: The big problem with the block size growth thing, is that so many seemingly nice proposals involve voting, but the only voting possible happens on the blockchain itself, and that's ultimately miner controlled.
233 2013-03-08 01:15:58 <jgarzik> += 40k per diff period
234 2013-03-08 01:15:58 <sipa> petertodd: i know
235 2013-03-08 01:16:12 <Luke-Jr> sipa: yes, I think keeping block sizes the way they are during the development stages (to encourage dev of alternate mechanisms), and then increasing the block size only later after we fill blocks WITH those in use, is ideal
236 2013-03-08 01:16:18 <gmaxwell> jgarzik: I would love that but I'm not aware of any simple rule which is obviously not equal to one of sipa's extremes.
237 2013-03-08 01:16:29 <petertodd> jgarzik: I kinda like log10(hashs/second) myself, but mainly because it'll grow so slowly...
238 2013-03-08 01:16:30 <PRab> I'm sure someone has said this, but I would be very likely to support any max block size growth that is essentially linear, but very likely disagree with anything that could go exponential.
239 2013-03-08 01:16:53 <jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: well, for differing versions of de-anonymize, i don't get their policy as they're trying to stop people doing stupdi shit to have anon access but the encourage stupid (possibly illegal) shit to register without de-anonimyzing
240 2013-03-08 01:16:54 <jgarzik> in general, I dislike feedback-based or miner-controlled block sizes
241 2013-03-08 01:16:56 <sipa> ultimately, block size limitations are about preventing miner's incentives to diverge too far from those of the rest of the network
242 2013-03-08 01:17:03 <jgarzik> pick one algorithm, and cement it in stone.
243 2013-03-08 01:17:16 <petertodd> Luke-Jr: Yes, and wait long enough until Bitcoin has been subject to attacks enough that we have a sense of the overall security challenge we're facing.
244 2013-03-08 01:17:27 <gmaxwell> jgarzik: I had thrown out a moderately more complicated one which caps the size growth to the hashrate growth, rational being that it silicon gets better we can measure it with difficulty increasins, also it backstops the fee collapse argument... but I do not love it.
245 2013-03-08 01:17:33 <petertodd> jgarzik: I've got an algorithm: blocksize = 1000000
246 2013-03-08 01:17:42 <petertodd> jgarzik: It is the default solution...
247 2013-03-08 01:17:50 <gmaxwell> jrmithdobbs: freenode's policy does not prevent banned trolls from flooding our channels.
248 2013-03-08 01:18:12 <jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: right, it's annoying to people with privacy concerns and ineffective at actually accomplishing it's goals
249 2013-03-08 01:18:19 <jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: aka, stupid
250 2013-03-08 01:18:21 <QwertyYouEyeOp> correct!!
251 2013-03-08 01:18:24 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Besides, the real issue isn't silicon, it's the even trickier to measure thing of how hard censorship resistant data distribution is.
252 2013-03-08 01:18:35 <QwertyYouEyeOp> jrmithdobbs: i agree.... kind of defeats the purpose
253 2013-03-08 01:18:38 <gmaxwell> jgarzik: My thinking is mostly that if a size is _safe_ it'll be obviously safe to almost everyone. And so a constant can just be updated. I think this was probably satoshi's thinking too, if he bothered thinking about it at all.
254 2013-03-08 01:18:38 <jgarzik> and who can say if this is all just academic? there may be enough "conscientious objectors" that a fork kills block size changes.
255 2013-03-08 01:18:38 <jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: welcome to consensus based policy! ;p
256 2013-03-08 01:18:54 <OneMiner> Increasing the fee could be a little more effective then planned. With the recent rise in bitcoin's price the fee is at $0.0225/KB. If the price increases much more it effectively increases the fee relative to USD. Plus I think the DP problem will persist because the gamblers may just see it as the cost of doing business.
257 2013-03-08 01:19:09 <jgarzik> gmaxwell: fee/blocksize is so crucial to the long term health of the system... and I do not think Satoshi thought much about it at all.
258 2013-03-08 01:19:15 <jgarzik> *relationship
259 2013-03-08 01:19:18 <gmaxwell> jgarzik: I'm not setting anyone arguing on the principle it should never change. (thank god!!).
260 2013-03-08 01:19:34 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Quite likely. Things like "well tor nodes re getting fast these days, and it's a pain in the ass to not be able to deposit my paycheck to my savings account directly"
261 2013-03-08 01:19:37 <gmaxwell> jgarzik: considering that his statements are now seen to be somewhat inconsistent, you're probably right. :(
262 2013-03-08 01:20:08 <jrmithdobbs> i wish he would have actually stuck around to justify some of that
263 2013-03-08 01:20:17 <jrmithdobbs> but he disappeared before the right questions were asked of him it seems
264 2013-03-08 01:20:26 <warren> For all we know, he's still here.
265 2013-03-08 01:20:28 <jrmithdobbs> the intent there is very murky
266 2013-03-08 01:20:42 <gmaxwell> I mean, we could ask him to comment. But I think it would be unwise and unjust for him to do so.
267 2013-03-08 01:21:00 <jrmithdobbs> warren: yes but without attaching the name that he's dropped answering that question is useless since we all can conjecture ;p
268 2013-03-08 01:21:04 <gmaxwell> Since god knows, right or wrong, anything he said would have an enormous influence. This is the founder problem.
269 2013-03-08 01:21:12 <jrmithdobbs> ya
270 2013-03-08 01:21:29 <warren> religions have the founder problem...
271 2013-03-08 01:21:30 <gmaxwell> It's so easy to just lean on authority.
272 2013-03-08 01:21:30 <QwertyYouEyeOp> Guys - I use BitCoin-QT, and i'm trying to do a transfer from that wallet to an online wallet. But I'm being told I need to pay the BTC0.005 fee. surely there's a way around that i fI'm sending to mysefl????
273 2013-03-08 01:21:33 <petertodd> gmaxwell: I think it'd be a very bad idea to get a cult of personality thing going again; better the cult is around someone who might as well be dead.
274 2013-03-08 01:21:38 <jrmithdobbs> it might end the argument but it might dictate something quite broken by doing so
275 2013-03-08 01:21:41 <jrmithdobbs> heh
276 2013-03-08 01:21:52 <warren> gmaxwell: but who writes the canon?
277 2013-03-08 01:21:59 <petertodd> gmaxwell: Puts Satoshi's life in danger potentially too, if authority doesn't like his opinions...
278 2013-03-08 01:22:05 <sipa> QwertyYouEyeOp: you're using the network, doing a transaction it might otherwise consider spam; it is irrelevant whether it's too yourself or not
279 2013-03-08 01:22:10 <sipa> QwertyYouEyeOp: bitcoin is not free
280 2013-03-08 01:22:14 <gmaxwell> QwertyYouEyeOp: if you're transfering all your coins you could potentially just import the keys from your bitcoin-qt wallet. (though this will give the online wallet access to them) Otherwise??? no.
281 2013-03-08 01:22:38 <warren> QwertyYouEyeOp: which online wallet?
282 2013-03-08 01:23:10 <QwertyYouEyeOp> so every time i make a transaction from my client i incur the 0.005 fee? i thought it was optional given certain criteria?
283 2013-03-08 01:23:23 <sipa> QwertyYouEyeOp: it is optional given certain criteria
284 2013-03-08 01:23:35 <OneMiner> QwertyYouEyeOp don't you mean 0.0005?
285 2013-03-08 01:24:01 <QwertyYouEyeOp> yes, 0.0005, sorry.
286 2013-03-08 01:24:13 <QwertyYouEyeOp> so what criteria do i need to meet? i thought i'd met them.
287 2013-03-08 01:24:21 <OneMiner> It's not that much generally. Don't worry broski, it's pretty cheap when you think about it.
288 2013-03-08 01:24:33 <sipa> QwertyYouEyeOp: you realize you're talking about $0.02, right?
289 2013-03-08 01:24:51 <QwertyYouEyeOp> it's not the amount i'm concerned about - it's the understanding of the system and the principle.
290 2013-03-08 01:24:54 <gmaxwell> QwertyYouEyeOp: you must have no outputs smaller than 0.01, and you must have enough priority... which is computed from the some of age of the inputs times their value divided by the size of the txn.
291 2013-03-08 01:25:22 <gmaxwell> Enough is set so that 1 BTC with 144 confirms (~1 day) in a 250 byte transaction meets the test.
292 2013-03-08 01:25:45 <CodeShark> QwertyYouEyeOp: the minimum fee is calculated from 1) the size of transaction (in bytes), 2) the size of the transaction outputs (in bitcoins/satoshis), and am I missing anything else, sipa?
293 2013-03-08 01:25:56 <QwertyYouEyeOp> gmaxwell: ok, well that makes sense for the 2nd part. i'm transferring >0.01 BTC. when you say outputs smaller than 0.01, do you mean if i transfer 1.0000001 bitcoins, i pay the fee? also, how do i think more clearly about the priority?
294 2013-03-08 01:26:03 <sipa> CodeShark: just from 1)
295 2013-03-08 01:26:10 <OneMiner> QwertyYouEyeOp I think that you misunderstand that the transaction has to go through the whole network. It's not just in a file on your PC. So the fee applies.
296 2013-03-08 01:26:34 <sipa> CodeShark: all the rest just determines whether you're allowed to go free or not
297 2013-03-08 01:26:37 <CodeShark> there's a rule that disallows free transactions if outputs are smaller than 0.01 bitcoins, no?
298 2013-03-08 01:26:38 <gmaxwell> QwertyYouEyeOp: no. I mean if you send 0.009 for example. (A transaction can have multiple destinations, none can be under the threshold)
299 2013-03-08 01:26:39 <QwertyYouEyeOp> oneminer: i understand that. but as other users have mentioned, the fee is waived given criteria
300 2013-03-08 01:26:55 <Luke-Jr> QwertyYouEyeOp: 0.01000001 BTC is > 0.01
301 2013-03-08 01:27:27 <OneMiner> QwertyYouEyeOp oh, my mistake then. Here you go: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction_fees
302 2013-03-08 01:27:29 <iwilcox> QwertyYouEyeOp: Have you read https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction_fees ?
303 2013-03-08 01:27:47 <gmaxwell> That page is a little dated and .. not the best.
304 2013-03-08 01:28:11 <QwertyYouEyeOp> yes, i've read it. but everyone here seems to be saying something a little different...
305 2013-03-08 01:28:38 <QwertyYouEyeOp> is anyone able to clearly say whether or not i CAN avoid paying the 0.0005? say i am transferring 1.000002 bitcoins.
306 2013-03-08 01:28:52 <warren> ACTION facepalm
307 2013-03-08 01:29:08 <jrmithdobbs> QwertyYouEyeOp: there's no way to say without broadcasting the txn and seeing if it's included
308 2013-03-08 01:29:15 <jrmithdobbs> not with 100% confidence, at least
309 2013-03-08 01:29:33 <jrmithdobbs> because no matter what's codified the people encoding the blocks decide what requires a fee and what doesn't
310 2013-03-08 01:29:42 <CodeShark> https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/main.cpp starting on line 574
311 2013-03-08 01:29:55 <sipa> QwertyYouEyeOp: yes, under some circumstances
312 2013-03-08 01:30:16 <sipa> QwertyYouEyeOp: for example, if your wallet consists of tons of small coins, or only very young coins, then no
313 2013-03-08 01:30:37 <QwertyYouEyeOp> jrmithdobbs: ok, so it's a function of where the coins that i have come from whether they require a fee? is that why when i made a transfer once before in a similar amount it didn't require a fee and now it does?
314 2013-03-08 01:30:47 <jrmithdobbs> not just that
315 2013-03-08 01:30:58 <warren> QwertyYouEyeOp: also age
316 2013-03-08 01:31:00 <QwertyYouEyeOp> sipa: how do i check that or work that out?
317 2013-03-08 01:31:21 <OneMiner> So regarding the TX fees and the DP from before. If the standard fee is doubled and then bitcoin's price doubles (stranger things have happened), transactions could get pretty pricey pretty quickly. Given the volitility of the exchange rate I'd be against that.
318 2013-03-08 01:31:24 <jrmithdobbs> partially that, yes, but it's also decided arbitrarily by the "miners" encoding the blocks and they are not held to any of the above and could require completely different fees for unrelated reasons
319 2013-03-08 01:32:07 <OneMiner> One of the selling points is inexpensive transactions after all. Could quite quicly get to the rate you'd pay for a piece of mail.
320 2013-03-08 01:32:13 <QwertyYouEyeOp> jrmithdobbs: so in theory it's possible that i get a coin that miner has said needs a BTC 1 fee?!
321 2013-03-08 01:32:23 <jrmithdobbs> QwertyYouEyeOp: what
322 2013-03-08 01:32:26 <warren> OneMiner: unless the community decides upon behavioral fee preferences, to increase the fee for certain spammy behavior but not normal behavior.
323 2013-03-08 01:32:44 <gmaxwell> OneMiner: there are many kinds of inexpensive though. You can easily spend $50 on an international wire transfer (or more).
324 2013-03-08 01:33:04 <jrmithdobbs> hell a cashiers check is $10-20
325 2013-03-08 01:33:28 <OneMiner> warren Still that could get out of hand. The market rate against the dollar fluctuates wildly. So that would amplify any changes (or reduce them).
326 2013-03-08 01:34:25 <OneMiner> You could get people trying to mass spam at oppurtune times relative to the exchange rate. In a crazy crazy world kind of scenario.
327 2013-03-08 01:34:49 <OneMiner> opportune
328 2013-03-08 01:34:52 <jrmithdobbs> not even a crazy crazy world scenario, people did similar games with hash power around diff changes in the past
329 2013-03-08 01:34:59 <jrmithdobbs> so that's not theorhetical, that's happened
330 2013-03-08 01:35:08 <QwertyYouEyeOp> so in summary, it's seemingly arbitrary whether i'm going to be charged a fee given 1) randomness where the blocks come from and the fees the miners demand and 2) the age of the coins i've been given. is that correct?
331 2013-03-08 01:35:16 <warren> In my opinion, behavioral fee preferences to better reflect the cost DP-like tx's are externalizing is our most feasible option. It won't *solve* the problem, just make it more expensive for DP-like behavior. More expensive gives a chance for miners to accept it as policy, and ordinary users are unaffected so they'd like it too.
332 2013-03-08 01:35:56 <gmaxwell> QwertyYouEyeOp: the priority test is a simple function. Its determinstic, and doesn't have anything to do with miners demanding things.
333 2013-03-08 01:36:48 <QwertyYouEyeOp> gmaxwell: on that note, is it possible to force my client to DEMOTE the priority of the transaction to forgo the fee?
334 2013-03-08 01:36:52 <jrmithdobbs> but the priority test doesn't actually garuantee you anything because no miner is bound by it (though most of them are using variations on the reference client's prioritization code)
335 2013-03-08 01:36:56 <QwertyYouEyeOp> (i know on some online wallets you can do that)
336 2013-03-08 01:36:57 <gmaxwell> QwertyYouEyeOp: it simply prevents someone from totally flooding out the network by bouncing a tiny value back and forth to themselves at super high speed. The fees it imposes are small.. at most 0.05 BTC, but typically 0.0005 BTC... which is enough to stop an economically rational attacker but not usually anyone else.
337 2013-03-08 01:37:06 <OneMiner> warren I'm interested in the behavioral fee idea. I haven't though about that before. Is there an example or link I could get?
338 2013-03-08 01:37:18 <jrmithdobbs> QwertyYouEyeOp: sure, you can broadcast what ever you like
339 2013-03-08 01:37:19 <Diablo-D3> EXCEPT
340 2013-03-08 01:37:27 <Diablo-D3> you don't want to stop legitimate microtransactions
341 2013-03-08 01:37:27 <jrmithdobbs> QwertyYouEyeOp: but there's also a chance that noone will ever accept it
342 2013-03-08 01:37:45 <jrmithdobbs> QwertyYouEyeOp: and if that's the case it'll never end up in a block
343 2013-03-08 01:37:46 <gmaxwell> jrmithdobbs: the reference client will not announce a transaction that it itself wouldn't relay or mine.
344 2013-03-08 01:37:53 <warren> OneMiner: I dunno, I haven't seen a list of proposals anywhere, and folks here seem to kneejerk reject it because per-KB size fees already somewhat do it, indirectly.
345 2013-03-08 01:38:04 <gmaxwell> jrmithdobbs: so it's already only nagging him for a fee in the case that its really really likely that the transaction will just get stuck.
346 2013-03-08 01:38:04 <jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: he asked if the client could be modified to change that, and yes, obviously it can ;p
347 2013-03-08 01:38:08 <QwertyYouEyeOp> jrmithdobbs: how would i make that happen using my client? (running the risk of low priority)?
348 2013-03-08 01:38:10 <jrmithdobbs> gmaxwell: i'm not condoning or suggesting it
349 2013-03-08 01:38:11 <OneMiner> warren Right, I see that.
350 2013-03-08 01:38:12 <CodeShark> QwertyYouEyeOp: there are two things here: whether the satoshi client will relay your transaction and whether a miner will accept it
351 2013-03-08 01:38:18 <CodeShark> they are two completely different things
352 2013-03-08 01:38:38 <QwertyYouEyeOp> i see.
353 2013-03-08 01:38:39 <gmaxwell> QwertyYouEyeOp: if you do that the transaction will almost certantly be stuck and then your funds won't be spendable until you find someone to help you hexedit your wallet.
354 2013-03-08 01:38:49 <warren> OneMiner: the two examples I could think of: 1) Increase the fee on spending 0-conf 2) Increase the fee on non-compressed key tx redemption
355 2013-03-08 01:39:01 <QwertyYouEyeOp> gmaxwell: haha... sounds like territory i don't want to enter.
356 2013-03-08 01:39:14 <QwertyYouEyeOp> i guess what's confusing is that i did a similar transaction yesterday and wasn't charged. now i'm being charged.
357 2013-03-08 01:39:26 <OneMiner> warren Nice, I'll ponder this.
358 2013-03-08 01:40:09 <warren> One problem that there might be with any of these proposals, if 90% of tx's per block are from DP, it could be profitable for DP itself to invest in mining to get it back.
359 2013-03-08 01:40:30 <warren> well, profitable is not the right word ...
360 2013-03-08 01:40:51 <iwilcox> If DP could be bothered mining they could probably be bothered running their own blockchain.
361 2013-03-08 01:41:41 <QwertyYouEyeOp> i'm trying to move BTC 0.5. here's the message from my client: "This transaction is over the size limit. You can still send it for a fee of 0.0005 BTC, which goes to the nodes that process your transaction and helps to support the network. Do you want to pay the fee?"
362 2013-03-08 01:41:45 <Luke-Jr> iwilcox: or even using compressed keys
363 2013-03-08 01:41:56 <QwertyYouEyeOp> what's the deal with the size limit??
364 2013-03-08 01:42:08 <CodeShark> too many kb
365 2013-03-08 01:42:18 <CodeShark> 10K is the limit
366 2013-03-08 01:42:24 <QwertyYouEyeOp> and what causes a file to be large?
367 2013-03-08 01:42:27 <OneMiner> Microtransactions could be valuable but they would have to be periodical right? Otherwise we'd have the same issue. One satoshi for each toothbrush swipe paid back from dental insurance, each with an individual transaction. Could be a disaster. So it would have to be highly regulated. Diablo-D3
368 2013-03-08 01:42:35 <CodeShark> or is it 27K?
369 2013-03-08 01:43:02 <CodeShark> it's large because you've got a lot of inputs, QwertyYouEyeOp
370 2013-03-08 01:43:04 <warren> OneMiner: these types of behavioral fees are regulatory decisions that influence behavior by adjusting underlying incentives. It's difficult to come up with rule changes that miners would like, and this at least has a chance of being accepted.
371 2013-03-08 01:43:07 <Diablo-D3> OneMiner: I think the proper response is "FUCK YOU I CANT EAT ALL THESE APPLES"
372 2013-03-08 01:43:24 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: lot's of little transactions in your wallet. It uses those as inputs to the one you want to do.
373 2013-03-08 01:43:29 <Vinnie_win> What's this "dead puppy" address thing?
374 2013-03-08 01:43:41 <Diablo-D3> OneMiner: but yeah, it wouldn't NEED to be regulated
375 2013-03-08 01:43:44 <QwertyYouEyeOp> @codeshark: meaning? what are the inputs? is there any way for me to control that?
376 2013-03-08 01:43:50 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: you must have received a lot of small amounts in the past.
377 2013-03-08 01:43:51 <Diablo-D3> OneMiner: it'll just get ran over by fee/kb sorting
378 2013-03-08 01:43:55 <warren> Vinnie_win: http://pastebin.com/ng9nF4K3
379 2013-03-08 01:43:59 <Vinnie_win> warren: Thank you
380 2013-03-08 01:44:15 <Vinnie_win> So there's no meaning
381 2013-03-08 01:44:19 <QwertyYouEyeOp> doublec: yes, i did. that's right. so is there a way for me to "tidy" this all up?
382 2013-03-08 01:44:25 <Vinnie_win> Why are DP tx "bad" ?
383 2013-03-08 01:45:00 <OneMiner> NSFW http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxAJqvslV7M&list=PL94A83DC128CC6B4B had to do it.
384 2013-03-08 01:45:12 <Luke-Jr> sorry, what is DP?
385 2013-03-08 01:45:16 <CodeShark> QwertyYouEyeOp: in order to tidy it up on the block chain you need someone to mine it for you - if you can find someone willing to mine it for free and give them the transaction out-of-band, you don't have to pay - but if you want it to propagate via the bitcoin network, you'll probably need to add the fee
386 2013-03-08 01:45:20 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: yes but it requires doing a number of transactions to yourself to consolidate the small inputs
387 2013-03-08 01:45:38 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: and doing it over time such that each transaction you do doesn't also get a fee due to priority
388 2013-03-08 01:45:54 <jgarzik> petertodd: one wonders if the RPC code shouldn't live inside python-bitcoinlib too
389 2013-03-08 01:45:58 <CodeShark> or you can do what doublec says - but it's probably not worth it :)
390 2013-03-08 01:46:04 <jgarzik> petertodd: certainly some apps will want both
391 2013-03-08 01:46:19 <QwertyYouEyeOp> codeshark: what you're suggesting with the miner is too complicated for me at this stage
392 2013-03-08 01:46:20 <petertodd> jgarzik: Yeah, lets do that
393 2013-03-08 01:46:24 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: in general, don't send tiny amounts to yourself
394 2013-03-08 01:46:28 <QwertyYouEyeOp> doublec: so if i pay the fee this time round, does that "consolidate" for me?
395 2013-03-08 01:46:34 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: or rather, don't receive them
396 2013-03-08 01:46:38 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: yes
397 2013-03-08 01:46:38 <OneMiner> Diablo-D3 standard fees right now probably exclude most things that a person would call microtransactions.
398 2013-03-08 01:46:47 <petertodd> jgarzik: And then we can make the rpc stuff easier to use without piles of hexlify and unhexlify and...
399 2013-03-08 01:46:49 <Diablo-D3> OneMiner: yes BUT you CAN go feeless
400 2013-03-08 01:46:49 <warren> Vinnie_win: Bitcoin is a global network, yet DP tx's fill 90% of blocks? DP is creating a large negative externality on the entire network for personal profit.
401 2013-03-08 01:46:59 <Diablo-D3> warren: SD you mean?
402 2013-03-08 01:47:00 <QwertyYouEyeOp> doublec: that was my mistake. i accepted some free coins when i started out. now i just want to clean them (hence sending them through a wallet). any suggestiosn for me?
403 2013-03-08 01:47:09 <warren> Diablo-D3: http://pastebin.com/ng9nF4K3
404 2013-03-08 01:47:17 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: pay the fee is the easiest way
405 2013-03-08 01:47:27 <Diablo-D3> wat.
406 2013-03-08 01:47:37 <Vinnie_win> warren: DP is not SD right?
407 2013-03-08 01:47:53 <petertodd> Vinnie_win: does SD remind you of live puppies or dead ones?
408 2013-03-08 01:47:57 <warren> It's really hard to not answer this question.
409 2013-03-08 01:48:08 <Vinnie_win> SD does not remind me of puppies at all
410 2013-03-08 01:48:09 <iwilcox> warren: I think perhaps if the pastebin included some why as well as some what.
411 2013-03-08 01:48:28 <petertodd> Vinnie_win: reach deep into your subconsious, feel the association
412 2013-03-08 01:48:28 <warren> It's funnier as a mysterious code name.
413 2013-03-08 01:48:35 <petertodd> warren: agreed
414 2013-03-08 01:48:57 <Vinnie_win> Here's an outsider's take on what this all sounds like, since I just read gmaxwell's post. Some new entity, who we cannot identify but have given the label "DP" has recently started flooding blocks with transactions containing higher than average fees (0.005BTC/kb)
415 2013-03-08 01:49:23 <QwertyYouEyeOp> @doublec: and if i pay the fee this time, i've solved the problem? even if i move the fractional 0.000018181 between my wallets?
416 2013-03-08 01:50:26 <warren> Vinnie_win: that would be fine if it were distributed across a larger number of users, as the underlying value from exchange increases with the number of users. But escalation of fees in this manner is premature for that.
417 2013-03-08 01:50:30 <CodeShark> if you only move 0.000018181 between wallets you'll still have a tiny output problem
418 2013-03-08 01:50:31 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: Any time you send a tiny amount you are causing trouble.
419 2013-03-08 01:50:42 <warren> QwertyYouEyeOp: what online wallet are you talking about here?
420 2013-03-08 01:51:06 <Vinnie_win> warren: Is SatoshiDice the source of these tx?
421 2013-03-08 01:51:13 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: if you send the total of your wallet, and it's greater than 0.1 or so, you'll consolidate the tiny amounts.
422 2013-03-08 01:51:27 <QwertyYouEyeOp> @doublec ha. ok. well, i want to "clean" these coins first, so i guess i'll pay the fee the first time round. then when i transfer them back to my wallet i'll just stop moving franctional amounts.
423 2013-03-08 01:52:05 <QwertyYouEyeOp> doublec: well, that's what i thought of doing! so if i send let's say 1.0000181818 BTC, and then send it back to myself, i've consolidated?
424 2013-03-08 01:52:05 <warren> QwertyYouEyeOp: one way to move it into blockchain wallet is to import the private keys from your wallet.dat. That way you "move" the BTC value without a network tx and associated fee.
425 2013-03-08 01:52:38 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: hard to say. it depends on what exactly is in your wallet and how bitcoin selects the inputs to use.
426 2013-03-08 01:52:41 <QwertyYouEyeOp> warren: the only reason for moving it from wallet is to get clean coins. i understand what you're saying but it's not what i'm after in this case
427 2013-03-08 01:52:43 <CodeShark> QwertyYouEyeOp: no need to send them to a separate wallet - you can just send it to a single address in your wallet
428 2013-03-08 01:52:58 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: easiest to send your entire wallet balance
429 2013-03-08 01:53:08 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: if you can
430 2013-03-08 01:53:30 <QwertyYouEyeOp> doublec: think that's what i'm going to do. as long as it sorts me out and i don't run into this problem down the road.....
431 2013-03-08 01:53:45 <doublec> like a lot of bitcoin related questions, the answer tends to be "it depends"
432 2013-03-08 01:53:47 <CodeShark> send your entire wallet balance to a single address in your wallet
433 2013-03-08 01:53:54 <CodeShark> then you'll have consolidated
434 2013-03-08 01:54:00 <warren> QwertyYouEyeOp: clean as in fewer inputs, or to disguise their source? You won't get help here for that. You might find options on Google, but they charge fees.
435 2013-03-08 01:54:11 <doublec> I'm asssuming 'fewer inputs'
436 2013-03-08 01:54:21 <QwertyYouEyeOp> right
437 2013-03-08 01:55:02 <QwertyYouEyeOp> doublec: does it matter whether i send the entire balance to a new 1) wallet or a new 2) address?
438 2013-03-08 01:55:16 <CodeShark> QwertyYouEyeOp: no
439 2013-03-08 01:55:28 <CodeShark> as far as the block chain is concerned, the two are indistinguishable
440 2013-03-08 01:55:36 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: what CodeShark said
441 2013-03-08 01:55:59 <QwertyYouEyeOp> codeshark: gotcha
442 2013-03-08 01:56:16 <QwertyYouEyeOp> (btw, am i doign this right to highlight your names as i send message in response to your comments? do i just put a colon after your name?)
443 2013-03-08 01:56:51 <Vinnie_win> retep is Peter Todd
444 2013-03-08 01:57:13 <Vinnie_win> Dead puppies are transactions from 1dice###
445 2013-03-08 01:57:15 <doublec> QwertyYouEyeOp: mentioning people's nicks is usually enough to highlight
446 2013-03-08 01:57:23 <QwertyYouEyeOp> doublec: cool :)
447 2013-03-08 01:57:25 <HM> except mine
448 2013-03-08 01:57:31 <HM> because people keep spelling hmm with one m
449 2013-03-08 01:57:45 <doublec> heh
450 2013-03-08 01:58:11 <warren> I'd hate to have the name "the".
451 2013-03-08 01:58:31 <iwilcox> Worse: "lol"
452 2013-03-08 01:59:21 <HM> why doesn't protobufs have a decent way to represent big ints
453 2013-03-08 01:59:38 <HM> more programming languages and utilities should support this stuff out of the box
454 2013-03-08 02:00:01 <aethero> This all sounds really simple to me. The people who run the pools should just do "If bitcoin address = deadpuppy then required fee = 0.01". It will cutdown on the spam, make miners more money, everyone wins.
455 2013-03-08 02:00:10 <aethero> Unless I am misunderstanding something.
456 2013-03-08 02:00:45 <warren> aethero: good luck getting people to agree
457 2013-03-08 02:00:55 <aethero> Why wouldn't they?
458 2013-03-08 02:01:08 <Diablo-D3> aethero: I have been asking for that for a year
459 2013-03-08 02:01:11 <Diablo-D3> I still don't have it
460 2013-03-08 02:01:17 <Diablo-D3> hell, I was asking for that BEFORE DP
461 2013-03-08 02:01:21 <Vinnie_win> isn't the problem with dp dust that they can't be economically spent, are unprunable, and take space in the blockchain of every full node in perpetuity?
462 2013-03-08 02:01:23 <Diablo-D3> just because I knew such a situation would exist
463 2013-03-08 02:01:32 <Diablo-D3> Vinnie_win: yes
464 2013-03-08 02:01:44 <Diablo-D3> thus kicking dead puppies is profitable
465 2013-03-08 02:02:08 <Vinnie_win> aethero: gmaxwell's thoughts on the monopolization of the limited resource: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=149668.msg1598230#msg1598230
466 2013-03-08 02:02:14 <warren> aethero: the path of least resistance is an fee increase agnostic to the address, assessed only on particular behavior. An increase that is modest enough to not destroy the behavior, but to make it more expensive. This is the only way miners will accept the rule change.
467 2013-03-08 02:02:59 <jrmithdobbs> what is dead puppy
468 2013-03-08 02:03:07 <jrmithdobbs> is that a new euphamism for satoshidice?
469 2013-03-08 02:03:13 <Vinnie_win> jrmithdobbs: Yes
470 2013-03-08 02:03:18 <jrmithdobbs> haha, i approve
471 2013-03-08 02:03:22 <warren> Vinnie_win: don't answer the question directly
472 2013-03-08 02:03:33 <OneMiner> DP is causing lots of harm to this conversation too.
473 2013-03-08 02:03:44 <OneMiner> The chat is bloated with DP!!! loololoz
474 2013-03-08 02:03:46 <Vinnie_win> warren: Oh is this what passes for fun?
475 2013-03-08 02:03:53 <warren> Vinnie_win: yes.
476 2013-03-08 02:03:57 <aethero> All of this DP convo is going to be stored into perpetuity
477 2013-03-08 02:04:06 <warren> that's fine.
478 2013-03-08 02:04:22 <iwilcox> Hey, as long as warren wants to do the correcting every time someone asks or errs, that's up to him/her/it.
479 2013-03-08 02:04:25 <Diablo-D3> what, no one says a word about me kicking dead puppies?
480 2013-03-08 02:04:32 <Diablo-D3> ACTION likes where this channel is headed
481 2013-03-08 02:04:46 <warren> Diablo-D3: with the new definition, it's fine.
482 2013-03-08 02:04:57 <Diablo-D3> with the old definition, its a great weekend project!
483 2013-03-08 02:05:10 <aethero> why all the code mumbo anyway
484 2013-03-08 02:05:24 <Diablo-D3> well, its just like milk toad
485 2013-03-08 02:05:27 <Diablo-D3> we hate it and make fun of it
486 2013-03-08 02:05:49 <iwilcox> warren: So how do you tune "modest enough"?
487 2013-03-08 02:05:50 <aethero> ah
488 2013-03-08 02:06:03 <HM> i don't see how you can block SD
489 2013-03-08 02:06:06 <warren> iwilcox: that will require some statistical analysis to figure out
490 2013-03-08 02:06:09 <HM> they'll just rotate their addresses
491 2013-03-08 02:06:11 <jrmithdobbs> HM: drop it's txns
492 2013-03-08 02:06:18 <jrmithdobbs> HM: several pools do already
493 2013-03-08 02:06:25 <HM> ^^
494 2013-03-08 02:06:31 <jrmithdobbs> HM: yet they don't
495 2013-03-08 02:06:40 <jrmithdobbs> and it works
496 2013-03-08 02:06:40 <warren> HM: hence I don't suggest blocking addresses. I suggest increasing fees on certain behaviors that are abnormal.
497 2013-03-08 02:06:50 <Diablo-D3> well
498 2013-03-08 02:06:54 <Diablo-D3> this is where I believe in a miners market
499 2013-03-08 02:06:56 <Vinnie_win> I believe the owner of SD saw this coming and that's why he sold 10% of his operation to get cash in hand
500 2013-03-08 02:07:05 <Diablo-D3> let most miners kick dead puppies
501 2013-03-08 02:07:15 <Diablo-D3> let the miners who don't get raped because their blocks are too huge
502 2013-03-08 02:07:21 <Diablo-D3> and they get out-raced every time
503 2013-03-08 02:07:38 <HM> warren: what behaviours?
504 2013-03-08 02:07:44 <jrmithdobbs> ya it's actually not in any miners interest to include those txns as things stand
505 2013-03-08 02:07:55 <HM> heuristics are always tricky
506 2013-03-08 02:07:59 <jrmithdobbs> if anything it just lowers their chance of winning the hash lottery due to size
507 2013-03-08 02:08:00 <Diablo-D3> seriously, Ive repeatedly asked even for a damned patch
508 2013-03-08 02:08:06 <Diablo-D3> that hardcodes dead puppies in bitcoin and drops them
509 2013-03-08 02:08:12 <jrmithdobbs> Diablo-D3: luke has one
510 2013-03-08 02:08:15 <warren> Diablo-D3: it was posted
511 2013-03-08 02:08:18 <Diablo-D3> REALLY?
512 2013-03-08 02:08:22 <Diablo-D3> did he build binaries too?
513 2013-03-08 02:08:29 <jrmithdobbs> Diablo-D3: it's on gitolite or w/e
514 2013-03-08 02:08:29 <warren> No
515 2013-03-08 02:08:30 <Diablo-D3> fuck
516 2013-03-08 02:08:32 <jrmithdobbs> no binaries
517 2013-03-08 02:08:36 <Diablo-D3> I _really_ hate building bitcoin
518 2013-03-08 02:08:37 <jrmithdobbs> gitorious
519 2013-03-08 02:08:38 <jrmithdobbs> i mean
520 2013-03-08 02:08:38 <Vinnie_win> Diablo-D3: I think this is it? https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=149668.msg1598216#msg1598216
521 2013-03-08 02:08:51 <warren> Diablo-D3: willing to pay for binaries?
522 2013-03-08 02:09:03 <jrmithdobbs> no he's a cheap bastard
523 2013-03-08 02:09:04 <warren> there's a market solution for people unwilling to build
524 2013-03-08 02:09:07 <iwilcox> Even if you drop DPs/dust rather than pass it on to your peers, you get the txns back via the next block, right?
525 2013-03-08 02:09:07 <OneMiner> +1 miners should take care of the DP problem. They need to be empowered though. I'm sure 9/10 don't know squat about how to do this.
526 2013-03-08 02:09:12 <HM> Diablo-D3: why is that
527 2013-03-08 02:09:27 <jrmithdobbs> iwilcox: only if the "miners" include it
528 2013-03-08 02:09:33 <Diablo-D3> gmaxwell: does that patch compile against 0.8.0?
529 2013-03-08 02:09:47 <jrmithdobbs> pretty sure it does
530 2013-03-08 02:09:54 <Vinnie_win> Here's another way to attack the problem - grow the Bitcoin economy so large that we hit the 1MB limit every time and drive fees above what would be profitable for....hate to use the term but...dead puppies
531 2013-03-08 02:10:03 <HM> I'm against the patch as anything but a very short term fix. If SD can do this then anyone can and it's a network issue
532 2013-03-08 02:10:09 <warren> HM: I thought of only two. 1) spending 0-conf tx. 2) redemption of non-compressed keys. There are likely other behaviors that are easy to identify.
533 2013-03-08 02:10:10 <Diablo-D3> Vinnie_win: this is what I said about 12 hours ago
534 2013-03-08 02:10:16 <Diablo-D3> Vinnie_win: everyone agreed
535 2013-03-08 02:10:22 <iwilcox> jrmithdobbs: OK, but at the moment there are still miners that do. What's the current benefit of running the satoshi client with the patch, apart from a warm fuzzy feeling?
536 2013-03-08 02:10:25 <warren> Diablo-D3: what distro do you use?
537 2013-03-08 02:10:30 <Vinnie_win> Diablo-D3: great minds think alike
538 2013-03-08 02:10:35 <Diablo-D3> if we just quit fucking around and start buying groceries and starbucks and prostitutes with bitcoins
539 2013-03-08 02:10:40 <Diablo-D3> dead puppies would go away
540 2013-03-08 02:10:51 <OneMiner> Feature request: Allow a running client to be modified to block transactions. Deny undesirable transactions or addresses. Problem, an attacker could spam clients to jam up the network.
541 2013-03-08 02:10:58 <jrmithdobbs> iwilcox: none of their txns in your memory pool ever
542 2013-03-08 02:10:59 <Diablo-D3> warren: debian, but Ill just build it myself
543 2013-03-08 02:11:03 <jrmithdobbs> iwilcox: you'll only have them in confirmed blocks
544 2013-03-08 02:11:05 <HM> Diablo-D3: I am all for people funding my hooker habits if they want to sell me bitcoins
545 2013-03-08 02:11:13 <iwilcox> warren: Help a newbie out with 1)...aren't there legitimate uses of spends of unconfirmed txns?
546 2013-03-08 02:11:16 <Diablo-D3> warren: I think they've fixed most of the stuff I bitched about
547 2013-03-08 02:11:24 <Diablo-D3> worlds cruftiest makefile
548 2013-03-08 02:11:33 <Diablo-D3> iwilcox: no.
549 2013-03-08 02:11:47 <warren> iwilcox: I don't know. This requires a lot more research to be sure potential behaviors really aren't normal.
550 2013-03-08 02:11:48 <Diablo-D3> iwilcox: and your client will avoid them when possible
551 2013-03-08 02:11:53 <CodeShark> there are certainly legitimate uses of spending unconfirmed transactions - I was running a server once that split income into multiple exchanges
552 2013-03-08 02:12:13 <Diablo-D3> iwilcox: and how unconfirmed? 0 confirms? your client cant spend those
553 2013-03-08 02:12:44 <CodeShark> I needed to split the income in order to balance my exchange accounts
554 2013-03-08 02:13:02 <warren> Or how about the dust tx? Jack up the fee on that. Don't need to block it outright.
555 2013-03-08 02:14:07 <Vinnie_win> There's another option, bite down on a piece of hard leather for however long it takes for the DP issue to no longer be a problem and just accept the finite amount of extra bloat
556 2013-03-08 02:14:30 <warren> Vinnie_win: that seems to be the current path.
557 2013-03-08 02:14:39 <Vinnie_win> warren: It's a valid option really
558 2013-03-08 02:14:45 <CodeShark> another possible use for spending unconfirmed transactions (but it depends on child-pays-for-parent) is adding more fees to a transaction you're receiving to get it to confirm more quickly
559 2013-03-08 02:14:56 <iwilcox> Til several other sites clone DP's model.
560 2013-03-08 02:15:08 <warren> CodeShark: "I was running a server once that split income into multiple exchanges" was this mining income or something else?
561 2013-03-08 02:15:18 <Vinnie_win> iwilcox: ironically, having multiple separate companies like DP would solve the problem
562 2013-03-08 02:15:33 <CodeShark> warren: something else
563 2013-03-08 02:15:51 <Diablo-D3> meh
564 2013-03-08 02:15:51 <Diablo-D3> Vinnie_win: its a valid option but
565 2013-03-08 02:15:51 <HM> what's the typical amount on current SD transactions? it's the change causing the problems right?
566 2013-03-08 02:15:53 <Diablo-D3> its easier to just piss in their cheerios
567 2013-03-08 02:16:09 <Diablo-D3> HM: no, the tx itself
568 2013-03-08 02:16:14 <Vinnie_win> Diablo-D3: Getting enough miners to agree to make a change is difficult
569 2013-03-08 02:16:25 <Diablo-D3> Vinnie_win: bzzt wrong
570 2013-03-08 02:16:34 <warren> Vinnie_win: I only somewhat agree.
571 2013-03-08 02:16:40 <Diablo-D3> most of the global mining power is held or managed by 12 people
572 2013-03-08 02:16:54 <Diablo-D3> a 90% switch is enough to sink the USS Dead Puppy
573 2013-03-08 02:16:58 <HM> 12 whole people
574 2013-03-08 02:16:58 <warren> In that thread, it seems BTC Guild won't do anything that is against DP.
575 2013-03-08 02:17:01 <Vinnie_win> warren: Agree with what, getting miners to make a change or that having several SD companies would speed us towards a resolution?
576 2013-03-08 02:17:12 <Diablo-D3> HM: yup
577 2013-03-08 02:17:15 <Diablo-D3> scary isn't it
578 2013-03-08 02:17:30 <Vinnie_win> that's not good at all
579 2013-03-08 02:17:32 <warren> Vinnie_win: there exist many DP-like companies, they don't have users for some reason. Not sure why.
580 2013-03-08 02:17:46 <HM> Diablo-D3: not really, i imagine 12 people could sink a nations economy if they wanted
581 2013-03-08 02:17:47 <Vinnie_win> warren: they aren't directly playable from blockchain.info
582 2013-03-08 02:18:10 <HM> like that porky fingered guy in that Danish bank who almost tanked the whole thing
583 2013-03-08 02:18:19 <Vinnie_win> Although there might only be 12 mining operators, if they make a change that results in less profits then a defector could get their users
584 2013-03-08 02:18:29 <jgarzik> mogri, petertodd: ok, pynode/python-bitcoinlib forked, dust settled, forum post posted.
585 2013-03-08 02:18:33 <Vinnie_win> Individual miners don't run full nodes anyway what do they care about bloat
586 2013-03-08 02:18:45 <warren> Vinnie_win: p2pool miners do.
587 2013-03-08 02:18:53 <Vinnie_win> warren: but p2pool isn't one of the 12
588 2013-03-08 02:18:54 <doublec> doesn't the sd creator have their own pool anyway? So they'll always be able to inclde their transactions at least some of the time.
589 2013-03-08 02:19:09 <warren> doublec: they do? which one?
590 2013-03-08 02:19:31 <Diablo-D3> p2pool isn't one of the twelve
591 2013-03-08 02:19:40 <Vinnie_win> what does voorhees say about it
592 2013-03-08 02:19:44 <HM> A political solution will probably be more effective than a technical one.
593 2013-03-08 02:20:00 <warren> HM: DP has rejected diplomatic solutions.
594 2013-03-08 02:20:10 <HM> I meant with the minors
595 2013-03-08 02:20:11 <iwilcox> Publicly?
596 2013-03-08 02:20:12 <HM> miners
597 2013-03-08 02:20:18 <Diablo-D3> time for defcon1
598 2013-03-08 02:20:18 <Diablo-D3> yup
599 2013-03-08 02:20:28 <Vinnie_win> rubber hose attack
600 2013-03-08 02:20:30 <Diablo-D3> wake up Master Negro and get the football for him
601 2013-03-08 02:20:39 <Diablo-D3> its time to play a game
602 2013-03-08 02:20:56 <doublec> warren: http://hhtt.1209k.com/
603 2013-03-08 02:20:57 <HM> thankfully, Satoshi has a backdoor....right? RIGHT?! Oh he doesn't?
604 2013-03-08 02:21:00 <HM> drag
605 2013-03-08 02:21:22 <gmaxwell> 19:18 < doublec> doesn't the sd creator have their own pool anyway? < I guess fireduck does, not clear what his level of involvement is.
606 2013-03-08 02:23:00 <Vinnie_win> Isn't the owner of sd involved in the bitcoin foundation and various other high profile stuff? it seems this is bad karma
607 2013-03-08 02:24:11 <Diablo-D3> Vinnie_win: you pay money to be involved in bitcoin foundation
608 2013-03-08 02:24:18 <Diablo-D3> his money is just as good as anyone else's
609 2013-03-08 02:25:40 <Vinnie_win> he's not on the board
610 2013-03-08 02:25:41 <warren> Well, I guess there's no interest in behavioral incentive fee adjustments. We're stuck with only per-KB fees.
611 2013-03-08 02:25:52 <Luke-Jr> Vinnie_win: Erik isn't
612 2013-03-08 02:25:56 <Luke-Jr> Matonis is though
613 2013-03-08 02:26:03 <Luke-Jr> hopefully when the elections happen that'll change
614 2013-03-08 02:26:12 <Vinnie_win> Luke-Jr: Right that's what I'm saying. What is Matonis' relationship to SD?
615 2013-03-08 02:26:17 <Luke-Jr> Vinnie_win: indirect
616 2013-03-08 02:26:18 <warren> Luke-Jr: who is eligible to vote?
617 2013-03-08 02:26:29 <Luke-Jr> warren: business members
618 2013-03-08 02:26:33 <gmaxwell> warren: there is no interest because who can you expect to lose money to impose them?
619 2013-03-08 02:26:47 <Luke-Jr> Vinnie_win: Erik, Matonis, and Roger ver are more or less a trio
620 2013-03-08 02:26:47 <warren> gmaxwell: I'm not convinced that all designs would lose money.
621 2013-03-08 02:27:24 <Luke-Jr> Vinnie_win: Erik floods the blockchain, Matonis dares governments to ban Bitcoin, and Roger ver promotes Bitcoin as radical anarchism
622 2013-03-08 02:27:26 <Vinnie_win> Ver criminal record, Erik shitting on the commons and Matonis well I just don't like how he looks
623 2013-03-08 02:27:27 <Diablo-D3> what use is the money if I have to spend it on a bigger hd?
624 2013-03-08 02:28:38 <jgarzik> Luke-Jr: heh
625 2013-03-08 02:28:41 <gmaxwell> warren: you give me a very high fee transaction but it sucks on your 'incentive' metric. Why am I not going to put it into my block? It's likely that some subsequent miner will do so anyways. So why not me?
626 2013-03-08 02:28:42 <Vinnie_win> is this tx spam causing confirmation times to go up
627 2013-03-08 02:28:52 <jgarzik> Luke-Jr: (not disagreeing...)
628 2013-03-08 02:29:20 <jgarzik> Vinnie_win: I would like to see somebody answer that substantively...
629 2013-03-08 02:29:28 <jgarzik> quantified
630 2013-03-08 02:29:41 <Luke-Jr> if I were out to kill Bitcoin, I'd do exactly what those 3 are doing <.<
631 2013-03-08 02:29:47 <gmaxwell> warren: if you expect other miners to go all dark-mark and orphan my block, then you've just described a protocol rule, though perhaps a crappy one because its not clear, consentual, and written down.
632 2013-03-08 02:29:50 <Vinnie_win> jgarzik: If it is, then it's probably mostly laziness of miners to uncomment the soft block size limit
633 2013-03-08 02:30:52 <Vinnie_win> Is there a graph of average confirmation time somewhere?
634 2013-03-08 02:30:54 <warren> gmaxwell: If <undesired behavior>, multiply required fee by <factor> such that priority is equal to <normal behavior with normal fee>. With this metric, DP behavior would need to adjust their fee higher to overcome the <factor> and achieve higher priority. Miners might like that, and users will like it.
635 2013-03-08 02:31:46 <iwilcox> Vinnie_win, jgarzik: Isn't it more likely that it's causing the frequency of orphans to go up, or am I missing something?
636 2013-03-08 02:31:48 <Vinnie_win> jgarzik: ah blockchain.info has an average confirmation time graph, and it appears to be decreasing over the last 12 months: https://blockchain.info/charts/avg-confirmation-time
637 2013-03-08 02:32:21 <Vinnie_win> ilwilcox: I would imagine these tx have no effect on orphan rate
638 2013-03-08 02:32:36 <Luke-Jr> Vinnie_win: I'd like to see the graph without SD included in it
639 2013-03-08 02:32:37 <gmaxwell> warren: But not so. DP keeps on trucking... there is a big backlog of unconfirmed DP transactions. I take them and earn a bunch of extra fees. DP's transactions get confirmed. He has no incentive to increase unless he wants the fastest possible confirmations. The rest of the miners have no reason to keep imposing the rules and forgoing income just to pay the defector.
640 2013-03-08 02:32:58 <warren> gmaxwell: This is not suggesting a "very high transaction fee" meant to destroy the undesired behavior, just make it more expensive than normal behavior, so they pay more to the externality. Sort of a "Pigouvian tax", make polluters pay.
641 2013-03-08 02:32:59 <Vinnie_win> ilwilcox: I think the primary objection is that they are unprunable, correct me if I'm wrong
642 2013-03-08 02:33:44 <gmaxwell> warren: it could be 1ct. It's in the miners best local interest to defect. It's in his best long term interest if he believes any other miner will defect.
643 2013-03-08 02:33:57 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: I thought that the size of the mempool hasn't really changed much...someone said that (might have been you)
644 2013-03-08 02:34:22 <Vinnie_win> I remember a web page that showed the average # of tx in the mempool somewhere
645 2013-03-08 02:35:06 <Vinnie_win> Here it is, # of unconfirmed tx looks like it comes from blockchain.info https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=149577.msg1594264#msg1594264
646 2013-03-08 02:35:17 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: huh? not sure what you're talking about. the DP transactions use up a bunch of block space resulting in making bitcoin more costly to run, driving people to centeralized services, etc. and they do this in excess of their real economic impact.
647 2013-03-08 02:35:28 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: mempool size isn't interesting. it's not a painpoint.
648 2013-03-08 02:35:37 <warren> gmaxwell: Defection is not certain. There exists a certain <factor> that balances increased income to miners with fear of reduced income due to DP discouragement.
649 2013-03-08 02:35:54 <gmaxwell> the DP txn also create UTXO bloat... which is perpetual data that must be in fast storage for validators.
650 2013-03-08 02:36:54 <gmaxwell> warren: it basically requires near 100% conformance though assuming DP doesn't care about super fast confirmations.
651 2013-03-08 02:36:56 <HM> why are SD creating unspent transactions
652 2013-03-08 02:37:18 <warren> HM: instant response is part of the psychological lure of DP
653 2013-03-08 02:37:25 <gmaxwell> HM: because they use the blockchain to send "you lost" messages.
654 2013-03-08 02:37:30 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: isn't block space size and utxo bloat the same thing i.e. "unprunable"
655 2013-03-08 02:37:50 <HM> aren't the "you lost" messages of some monetary value and spendable?
656 2013-03-08 02:38:01 <phantomcircuit> HM, 1 satoshi
657 2013-03-08 02:38:02 <phantomcircuit> so no
658 2013-03-08 02:38:17 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: no. Blockspace size is usually prunable. UTXO are unprunable but thue ones create are technically spendable but not worth spending.
659 2013-03-08 02:38:17 <HM> why is 1 satoshi not spendable
660 2013-03-08 02:38:37 <gmaxwell> HM: because it costs more in loss of priority or fees than its worth.
661 2013-03-08 02:38:54 <HM> then why bother allowing transactions of 1 satoshi
662 2013-03-08 02:39:08 <gmaxwell> They're not all 1 satoshi anymore, they're now small 'random' values. (I assume because people started blocking them)
663 2013-03-08 02:39:10 <CodeShark> what do you suggest the minimum amount be, HM?
664 2013-03-08 02:39:18 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: So a concise definition of the objectionable behavior is "creation of economically unspendable outputs"
665 2013-03-08 02:39:22 <HM> CodeShark: 1 satoshi
666 2013-03-08 02:39:23 <gmaxwell> HM: at one point bitcoin client software wouldn't.
667 2013-03-08 02:39:37 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: thats certantly part of it, like many things it's not bad in just one way.
668 2013-03-08 02:39:43 <warren> gmaxwell: It's better than the entirely ineffective 4.3% of hashing power ignoring DP tx's. (wild ass guess). This exploits greed on the part of amoral miners, who can realize they can realize that they can claim a larger portion of DP's pie.
669 2013-03-08 02:39:59 <warren> redundant redundant
670 2013-03-08 02:40:00 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: What are the additional problems? I have only identified the one
671 2013-03-08 02:40:59 <Vinnie_win> Has anyone called our Voorhees in the forum?
672 2013-03-08 02:41:03 <Vinnie_win> *called out
673 2013-03-08 02:41:28 <Luke-Jr> the forum is a joke, but multiple people have confronted him there and on IRC
674 2013-03-08 02:42:02 <Vinnie_win> how about asking MPOE to delist the "security" until they fix the spam
675 2013-03-08 02:42:05 <Vinnie_win> (long shot I know)
676 2013-03-08 02:42:29 <HM> the sad reality is bitcoin needs to be able to scale to any usage pattern. my bank wont' stop me placing a 1p visa transaction
677 2013-03-08 02:42:29 <warren> Vinnie_win: ineffective, there's tons of other "stock markets"
678 2013-03-08 02:42:50 <HM> the minimum denomination should be spendable
679 2013-03-08 02:42:51 <Luke-Jr> Vinnie_win: MPOE is run by someone almost as insane as them
680 2013-03-08 02:42:56 <CodeShark> HM, retailers will stop you placing 1p transactions :p
681 2013-03-08 02:43:03 <Vinnie_win> warren: Sure there's other markets but the resulting disruption could raise awareness and prompt "shareholder" action
682 2013-03-08 02:43:05 <CodeShark> because it's they who pay the fees directly
683 2013-03-08 02:43:05 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: They're creating a huge txn load disproportionally with the economic activity involved.. one or two bot players are basically forcing other bitcoin users to pay 0.005 BTC/kb to get fast transactions.
684 2013-03-08 02:43:15 <iwilcox> HM: They'll start charging you for a business account if you keep spending 1p.
685 2013-03-08 02:43:26 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: which isn't perhaps fundimentally a problem, it's an issue in the short term assuming we want to maximize bitcoin's adoption.
686 2013-03-08 02:43:54 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: I'm not so sure that the tx load is a real problem. The economically unspendable outputs seems the main problem. Is there a third issue?
687 2013-03-08 02:44:25 <warren> Vinnie_win: the economically unspendable outputs also cause memory bloat on a permanent basis
688 2013-03-08 02:44:28 <warren> not just disk
689 2013-03-08 02:44:35 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: I think the load is actually the bigger short term problem. The UTXO bloat is a bigger long term problem.
690 2013-03-08 02:44:40 <Vinnie_win> warren: Yeah, like gmaxwell said it needs to be in fast storage
691 2013-03-08 02:44:43 <gmaxwell> warren: what. no they do not.
692 2013-03-08 02:44:47 <warren> oh? hmm
693 2013-03-08 02:44:52 <gmaxwell> It needs to be in fast storage but not ram.
694 2013-03-08 02:45:04 <warren> misunderstood, sorry.
695 2013-03-08 02:45:10 <warren> HM: I avoided your name.
696 2013-03-08 02:45:20 <CodeShark> economically unspendable outputs can be put in slower RAM
697 2013-03-08 02:45:20 <HM> Have a cookie
698 2013-03-08 02:45:22 <HM> and a dead puppy
699 2013-03-08 02:45:25 <CodeShark> or slower storage
700 2013-03-08 02:45:40 <gmaxwell> CodeShark: they must be online though. Otherwise one gets spent and the network forks.
701 2013-03-08 02:45:49 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: What's the problem with the load? Bandwidth?
702 2013-03-08 02:45:58 <gmaxwell> CodeShark: if we adopt a self-balancing committed utxo even what you're suggesting may not be possible.
703 2013-03-08 02:46:09 <CodeShark> yes, of course they must be online - just saying that it's better to give the more probable-to-be-spent transactions faster memory
704 2013-03-08 02:46:19 <CodeShark> oh...
705 2013-03-08 02:46:21 <CodeShark> hmm
706 2013-03-08 02:46:37 <CodeShark> yeah, crap - they are still part of the merkle trees
707 2013-03-08 02:47:01 <Vinnie_win> Shouldn't we assume that tx load will always be at the point where blocks are filled to the 1MB limit? Because this condition of having an under-utilized network is only temporary and it's proportion of influence will trend towards zero over time
708 2013-03-08 02:47:02 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: the time it someone making a regular transaction to get confirmed OR the fees they have to pay to not take that time. Right now to get ahead of DP you need to use 0.005BTC/KB. so a bloaty 100KB transaction would need a fee of 0.5 BTC.
709 2013-03-08 02:47:41 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: that under-utilizedness is part of our "startup capital"
710 2013-03-08 02:47:43 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: I see, so it's the fees
711 2013-03-08 02:47:52 <gmaxwell> also the "startup capital"
712 2013-03-08 02:48:16 <gmaxwell> think of it this way: if bitcoin is used everywhere and its very valable.. whos going to mind that it takes 24 hours to bringup a new bitcoin node? No one.
713 2013-03-08 02:48:16 <Vinnie_win> Good way to think of it. And these bastards are basically stealing this goodwill
714 2013-03-08 02:48:19 <warren> Vinnie_win: it is more desirable to reach the limit due to organic growth, more users means more inherent value in the network. One or two bots spamming doesn't increase the value by that metric.
715 2013-03-08 02:48:36 <Vinnie_win> Yes
716 2013-03-08 02:48:40 <gmaxwell> If bitcoin is some obsecure and unproven online thing who is going to mind that it takes 24 hours to bringing up new node? everyone.
717 2013-03-08 02:48:51 <HM> you're forgetting SD isn't your only problem
718 2013-03-08 02:48:57 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: well 'bastards' may be too strong a word.
719 2013-03-08 02:49:12 <HM> if SD can do this then anyone can implement this denial of service attack
720 2013-03-08 02:49:17 <gmaxwell> HM: not quite!
721 2013-03-08 02:49:23 <Vinnie_win> DP spam creates two problems: economically unspendable and unprunable transactions, and an overall increase in the fees required to get a transaction confirmed in a reasonable time
722 2013-03-08 02:49:24 <HM> why?
723 2013-03-08 02:49:30 <gmaxwell> HM: we _were_ attacked this way in the past, thats how we got the minimum fees to begin with!
724 2013-03-08 02:49:52 <gmaxwell> HM: and the fees have been quite effective because the attackers are economically rational and the fees make attacking somewhat expensive.
725 2013-03-08 02:49:52 <Vinnie_win> ^^ is that the whole of it?
726 2013-03-08 02:50:16 <CodeShark> the problem is that SD players are not rational :p
727 2013-03-08 02:50:21 <HM> look, clearly the SD bots are run by SD themselves right?
728 2013-03-08 02:50:21 <Luke-Jr> ACTION wonders if it would help to make Bitcoin-Qt builds that refuse to relay blocks containing SD crap O.o
729 2013-03-08 02:50:29 <gmaxwell> Our current dead puppy factor breaks the model because the consumers of dead puppies are by definition economically irrational (or at least 'concerned with other things than the price of their txn')
730 2013-03-08 02:50:30 <HM> otherwise whoever it is would have gone bust?
731 2013-03-08 02:50:32 <Vinnie_win> HM: They are?
732 2013-03-08 02:50:37 <warren> We're concerned about a negative externality, pollution that costs everyone for personal gain. A normal economic way of dealing with pollution is to increase taxes on the behavior. In our case it can be done in such a way that miners' greed will go along with it once they realize through collusion they can claim a larger portion of DP's profits.
733 2013-03-08 02:50:49 <CodeShark> why would SD play bots against itself?
734 2013-03-08 02:51:02 <HM> who knows
735 2013-03-08 02:51:05 <gmaxwell> HM: you can spend all night on the conspiracy theories. In any case, whatever it is, they've found a way to monitize this behavior which is otherwise very hard to monetize.
736 2013-03-08 02:51:13 <HM> why would anyone play an -EV game using a bot unless they were somehow profiting?
737 2013-03-08 02:51:14 <CodeShark> other than block chain advertisement (which is arguably negative), it gets them nothing - and they have to pay fees
738 2013-03-08 02:51:50 <Luke-Jr> CodeShark: SD then pretends it's responsible for most Bitcoin adoption/use, increasing their stock value
739 2013-03-08 02:51:55 <gmaxwell> Either it's real gambling (with bots?!@?#), or money laundering, or pumping stock, or whatever. ... it's not clear that its reproducable whatever it is. And at least so far nothing else seems to have failed to be thwarted by the basic fee rules.
740 2013-03-08 02:51:57 <HM> driving up minimum fees might be exactly what they want
741 2013-03-08 02:52:07 <Vinnie_win> Well, on a positive note I feel a lot better about my Bitcoin investment now that I've witnessed that the principal engineers working on it are calm, rational, thoughtful, and analytical - thanks guys
742 2013-03-08 02:52:12 <warren> As a collusive miner policy, the pollution behavior tax can be changed or removed at any time.
743 2013-03-08 02:52:18 <gmaxwell> HM: or forcing larger blocksizes, for that matter. But this is all guessing, who knows.
744 2013-03-08 02:52:54 <gmaxwell> warren: implicit collusive policy is very dangerous for the currency because it increases the time until consensus unless its (nearly) unanimous.
745 2013-03-08 02:52:59 <Vinnie_win> Any increase in minimum fee directly affects DP bottom line
746 2013-03-08 02:53:01 <warren> DP could combat this by investing in their own mining pool.
747 2013-03-08 02:53:33 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: dunno about that, they pass the fees onto the players. You're assuming the players are return sensitive. I don't know that the evidence supports that: as DP increase their rake their traffic increased.
748 2013-03-08 02:53:52 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: they increased the house cut?
749 2013-03-08 02:54:00 <warren> gmaxwell: a disruption of consensus such that DP players freak out due to uncertainty may also have a desirable outcome (to us), but that isn't what I'm suggesting at all.
750 2013-03-08 02:54:01 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: yes, twice early on.
751 2013-03-08 02:54:22 <CodeShark> warren: I think it is safe to assume that DP players are not rational :)
752 2013-03-08 02:54:28 <Vinnie_win> That's definitely a safe assumption
753 2013-03-08 02:54:42 <gmaxwell> Their house cut is already very questionably small. but I suppose the actual value doesn't matter: players will just play more.. their cut is actually unbounded. :P
754 2013-03-08 02:54:46 <HM> My proposal is not to block SD, but to require an even higher fee on SD transactions
755 2013-03-08 02:54:51 <Vinnie_win> I should put up a site that lets you send Bitcoins and I will guarantee that you always get exactly 99% of your money back...
756 2013-03-08 02:54:56 <HM> there must be a fee level they cannot support
757 2013-03-08 02:55:01 <Luke-Jr> HM: same effect
758 2013-03-08 02:55:12 <gmaxwell> (what I mean by questionably small: the DP factory side of the bet fails the kelly criteria unless their bankroll is like a kazillion dollars)
759 2013-03-08 02:55:28 <iwilcox> Vinnie_win: With odds that good nobody would play :)
760 2013-03-08 02:55:38 <gmaxwell> (at least for the larger multipliers)
761 2013-03-08 02:55:47 <warren> gmaxwell: assuming they arent cheating with hash filters
762 2013-03-08 02:55:50 <gmaxwell> (meaning that??? from a pure math perspective we should expect DP to go bankrupt)
763 2013-03-08 02:56:08 <gmaxwell> warren: sure sure, if they're not really gambling then all that goes out the window.
764 2013-03-08 02:56:44 <gmaxwell> So then you have the P(fails at math|irrational rake) vs P(really laundering money|irrational rake) vs P(stock pumping|irrational rake) :P
765 2013-03-08 02:56:53 <gmaxwell> who know, who cares.. thats tabloid stuff.
766 2013-03-08 02:57:19 <Vinnie_win> So this undesirable behavior can be detected algorithmically
767 2013-03-08 02:57:27 <Vinnie_win> (without hard coding a dp address)
768 2013-03-08 02:58:24 <warren> In any case, none of the proposed solutions to stop DP will work, given they go against amoral profit maximizing miner behavior. My polluter behavioral tax suggestion at least has a chance of miner adoption since it really does allow them to make more profits.
769 2013-03-08 02:58:42 <Vinnie_win> warren: how's the behavioral tax go again
770 2013-03-08 02:59:02 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: the economically non-viable outputs can only be to the extent that we can algorithmically define non-viable.
771 2013-03-08 02:59:23 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: how about if the output is less than the fee
772 2013-03-08 02:59:37 <Vinnie_win> I mean to say...what's wrong with checking for output < fee
773 2013-03-08 02:59:46 <Vinnie_win> obviously there's something wrong with it since no one suggested it
774 2013-03-08 02:59:50 <HM> I've lost track of how many external Bitcoin observors have said for years it won't scale
775 2013-03-08 03:00:31 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: uh....
776 2013-03-08 03:00:36 <HM> I can't help thinking anything that tries to enforce a long term policy is a spiral toward death
777 2013-03-08 03:00:37 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: hey, thats snazzy.
778 2013-03-08 03:00:44 <Vinnie_win> come on now
779 2013-03-08 03:00:47 <HM> social policy*
780 2013-03-08 03:00:53 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: I know there's something wrong with it
781 2013-03-08 03:00:56 <warren> Vinnie_win: If <undesired behavior>, multiply required fee by <factor> such that priority is equal to <normal behavior with normal fee>. With this metric, DP behavior would need to adjust their fee higher to overcome the <factor> and achieve higher priority. Through some statistical analysis, miners can come to consensus on a balance of <factor> that boosts their profits. The end result is lower fees for normal tx's, more miner income.
782 2013-03-08 03:01:16 <Vinnie_win> warren: Yeah I was really asking about the definition of <undesired behavior>
783 2013-03-08 03:01:25 <warren> Vinnie_win: that requires research as well
784 2013-03-08 03:01:33 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: I mean, it suffers from the 'some other miner will take it'.. and you have to define something to do with free txn...
785 2013-03-08 03:02:04 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: Free txn have to have aged coins so thats a limited resource which will exhaust itself and therefore, not really a problem?
786 2013-03-08 03:03:07 <HM> value < fee makes sense to me, might make some coin burning schemes tricky though
787 2013-03-08 03:03:24 <Vinnie_win> The problem with value<fee is miner defection.
788 2013-03-08 03:03:25 <warren> gmaxwell: You don't need 100% miner adoption for this to work. Player uncertainty of "when will my coins confirm?" may be enough to force DP to pay the higher policy.
789 2013-03-08 03:03:42 <warren> gmaxwell: DP relies much on "instant" psychology
790 2013-03-08 03:03:50 <HM> a miner isn't going to ignore a 100 BTC fee on a 1 BTC transaction :P
791 2013-03-08 03:03:56 <Vinnie_win> The win tx are not the problem though, it's the loss tx right?
792 2013-03-08 03:04:27 <gmaxwell> warren: I've not seen evidence of that. then again, I've not seen too much evidence of actual players existing. :(
793 2013-03-08 03:04:53 <gmaxwell> E.g. the tx mutation stuff was going on for weeks before someone showed up claiming that his wallet was stuck because of it.
794 2013-03-08 03:04:53 <Vinnie_win> How about asking blockchain.info not to provide playable direct links to dp?
795 2013-03-08 03:05:34 <warren> gmaxwell: even DP-absent from this analysis, we *know* certain behaviors that fit within a KB is more costly to the network than other behaviors. We currently give them all the same fee, but we don't have to.
796 2013-03-08 03:05:53 <gmaxwell> HM: many would, in fact. But this kind of argument isn't lost on me. I made it myself on the forum today.
797 2013-03-08 03:05:55 <iwilcox> If the instant thing is so key to the appeal of DP then rather than impose a monetary fee on DP txns, just tar-pit them.
798 2013-03-08 03:06:11 <gmaxwell> iwilcox: if you don't mine them someone else will.
799 2013-03-08 03:06:12 <OneMiner> I'm sorry to even say this but whatever solution is chosen it'll have to pass a public relations test in addition to working properly. I can almost hear the anarchists screaming about tyranny. I'm sorry to even type out this FUD but it seems like something to keep in mind.
800 2013-03-08 03:06:26 <warren> iwilcox: that's only possible without miner cooperation if all the main clients impose that policy
801 2013-03-08 03:06:34 <warren> iwilcox: bitcoind, armory, multibit, blockchain, etc.
802 2013-03-08 03:06:41 <Vinnie_win> OneMiner: I sure hope that people with commit access to Bitcoin's github repo do not use forum opinion to drive development
803 2013-03-08 03:06:46 <gmaxwell> OneMiner: yea, I had good policy down in the past because of that kind of stuff. oh well.
804 2013-03-08 03:06:54 <iwilcox> warren: Ditto your revised fee schedule, though, surely+
805 2013-03-08 03:06:55 <iwilcox> ?
806 2013-03-08 03:07:17 <warren> iwilcox: no. Small number of miner operators would need to adopt it, and they have profit incentive to do so.
807 2013-03-08 03:07:45 <gmaxwell> I mean, Vinnie_win's policy could even be a soft forking network rule. This cures defection.
808 2013-03-08 03:08:02 <warren> which policy? If output < fee?
809 2013-03-08 03:08:06 <gmaxwell> Yes.
810 2013-03-08 03:08:07 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: You mean the forwarding rules?
811 2013-03-08 03:08:38 <warren> gmaxwell: that would be one of several behaviors to tax more heavily under my suggestion, with miners happily agreeing to it if they can collect higher fees.
812 2013-03-08 03:08:51 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: I mean don't allow txn to be mined if output < fee. Miners could still create dust, of course, but they're also full nodes who get to enjoy the utxo costs.
813 2013-03-08 03:09:28 <HM> I think someone should make a list of desirable transaction properties, and undesirable ones, from a pure network stability point of view, and work on a set of rules that consider all of them
814 2013-03-08 03:09:31 <warren> Exclude miners from dust collection by the pollution tax. that's easy enough. Let the dust receivers deal with the consequences on their own. =)
815 2013-03-08 03:09:46 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: Not clear how that policy prevents defection. Do you mean to say that out<fee tx will not be forwarded to peers, or that miners shouldn't include them in a block?
816 2013-03-08 03:09:48 <gmaxwell> warren: huh?!@
817 2013-03-08 03:10:12 <warren> gmaxwell: failed attempt of a joke
818 2013-03-08 03:10:15 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: I'm saying that if a block mines a transaction with an output less than the transactions fee, the block is invalid.
819 2013-03-08 03:10:23 <warren> HM: we don't need to label them as desireable and undesireable. Cost for different behaviors can be calculated.
820 2013-03-08 03:10:43 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: So miners will not attempt to build new blocks on top of blocks with out<fee
821 2013-03-08 03:10:45 <warren> HM: actual cost, not KB cost.
822 2013-03-08 03:11:20 <HM> this hodge-podge approach of patching transaction policy as problems arise is going to suck. there's just got to be a policy that can be described by some formula that provides "good enough" middle of the road performance
823 2013-03-08 03:11:21 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: That's will increase an individual miner's orphan rate if less than N% of the miners upgrades to the rule
824 2013-03-08 03:11:26 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: not just that, but nodes will reject it.. even if miners love it. I'm not promoting that idea, I'm just pointing out that its something which could technically be made a protcol rule.
825 2013-03-08 03:11:48 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: no, it's VERY bad to have an inconsistent acceptance rule because it forks the network.
826 2013-03-08 03:11:53 <iwilcox> warren: Let's say bitcoin-qt/bitcoind alone delay relay of DP txns. They make up 75% of the network. What do DP players and other clients do?
827 2013-03-08 03:12:28 <gmaxwell> iwilcox: thats asusming there are players. But assuming that they just connect their nodes directly to the DP factory.
828 2013-03-08 03:12:50 <warren> HM: This isn't exactly hodge-podge. A few statisticians calculate the optimal <factor> for different behaviors based on actual cost to the network and what the market is willing to stomach. Mining operators occasionally adjust their pollution factors to what they think will maximize their own profit.
829 2013-03-08 03:12:54 <gmaxwell> addnode=1.2.3.4 it's a one line configuration change.
830 2013-03-08 03:13:07 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: I see. So the reference client will drop blocks with out<fee.
831 2013-03-08 03:13:11 <gmaxwell> warren: we could call them "The Fed" if that name isn't already taken.
832 2013-03-08 03:13:19 <warren> gmaxwell: haha
833 2013-03-08 03:13:39 <HM> The Bank of England is considering negative interest rates
834 2013-03-08 03:13:47 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: ::nods:: again, I'm not promoting it, just pointing out that it could be done and would cure defection.
835 2013-03-08 03:14:17 <warren> Vinnie_win: This has nothing to do with orphans.
836 2013-03-08 03:14:28 <gmaxwell> HM: real interest on treasury bonds is negative in the US right now. (real meaning post inflation)
837 2013-03-08 03:14:30 <Vinnie_win> warren: Right, got it. It would be a block validation rule in the reference client
838 2013-03-08 03:14:47 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: The success of that scheme depends on users accepting this change in policy and upgrading
839 2013-03-08 03:14:47 <warren> Vinnie_win: not even that, this would require no changes to clients
840 2013-03-08 03:15:05 <Vinnie_win> http://codepad.org/49wHK7KC Anyone want to suggest edits before I post it?
841 2013-03-08 03:15:10 <warren> Vinnie_win: wait, we're talking about two different things here...
842 2013-03-08 03:15:23 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: the way we've deployed other softforking changes in the past is having miners add a flag to block indicating that when the flag density was high enough that they'd enforce the rule. This way you don't get forks created.
843 2013-03-08 03:15:50 <Vinnie_win> got it
844 2013-03-08 03:15:50 <warren> gmaxwell: The pollution tax doesn't require a soft-fork.
845 2013-03-08 03:16:03 <Vinnie_win> warren: isn't the pollution tax vulnerable to defection
846 2013-03-08 03:16:04 <warren> gmaxwell: and it can achieve Vinnie_win's policy goal without client changes
847 2013-03-08 03:16:05 <HM> gmaxwell: I mean the BoE wants to charge banks for depositing cash with them
848 2013-03-08 03:16:17 <warren> Vinnie_win: not when miners have profit incentive
849 2013-03-08 03:16:24 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: it's a perfectly reasonable sounding message. I believe the response will entertain us for minutes at least! :P
850 2013-03-08 03:16:42 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: can't hurt to try, and costs me nothing
851 2013-03-08 03:16:51 <Vinnie_win> https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=101902.msg1598818#msg1598818
852 2013-03-08 03:17:04 <gmaxwell> warren: your pollution tax stuff is vulnerable to defection and you need to conjure up a Fed to even give you the parameters. :P
853 2013-03-08 03:17:04 <Vinnie_win> next up, similar post for blockchain.info to remove dp links
854 2013-03-08 03:17:31 <gmaxwell> warren: Vinnie_win's fee criteria for the viability of outputs doesn't have any parameterization.
855 2013-03-08 03:17:34 <warren> gmaxwell: I'll do more research.
856 2013-03-08 03:17:47 <HM> I'm kind of ruthless.
857 2013-03-08 03:17:47 <Vinnie_win> how about a technical solution on the dp end - can't they just roll multiple tx together into a single tx with larger outputs maybe?
858 2013-03-08 03:18:08 <Vinnie_win> if dp have enough tx volume then they could still have near instant response but roll multiple tx together in 1
859 2013-03-08 03:18:11 <warren> gmaxwell: I like Vinnie_win's idea too.
860 2013-03-08 03:18:40 <litropy> bitcoin-qt has been syncing for like 6 hours; I'm at about 80%, averaging about 200 blocks/min. Is this normal?
861 2013-03-08 03:19:02 <Vinnie_win> I think if there's a way to make dp tx more palatable by combining multiple tx into a single one that doesn't have the unprunable problem they might accept it
862 2013-03-08 03:20:10 <CodeShark> they could also use a different mechanism for indicating losses than sending 1 satoshi
863 2013-03-08 03:20:13 <HM> why the fuck don't SD just post results on their website :|
864 2013-03-08 03:21:17 <gmaxwell> litropy: what version? well. thats not so bad.. the time can depend a lot on how lucky you got with your peers.
865 2013-03-08 03:21:23 <Vinnie_win> HM: You can gamble straight from your blockchain.info wallet
866 2013-03-08 03:21:24 <iwilcox> It's more expensive than using Bitcoin for hosting.
867 2013-03-08 03:21:36 <gmaxwell> CodeShark: they could do lots of things
868 2013-03-08 03:22:03 <CodeShark> but they won't unless there's some incentive for them to do so
869 2013-03-08 03:22:10 <gmaxwell> Correct.
870 2013-03-08 03:23:00 <gmaxwell> Their response to jeff was basically "if we're causing problems, bitcoin is broken, you better work on fixing your software" and they claim to be doing the community a service. To which plenty of #@$@suckers on the forum happily agree.
871 2013-03-08 03:23:12 <HM> I somewhat agree
872 2013-03-08 03:23:18 <litropy> gmaxwell, v0.8.0.0
873 2013-03-08 03:23:20 <warren> gmaxwell: pollution tax is vulnerable to defection even if miners have profit incentive? The "Fed" part is hard math, but worthwhile given the importance to the health of the network. Note that the "Fed" isn't an authority at all, it's just someone doing math.
874 2013-03-08 03:23:37 <Vinnie_win> I disagree completely. Bitcoin in the long run is not broken but dp is doing the equivalent of kicking a baby
875 2013-03-08 03:23:49 <Vinnie_win> Try that on an adult and see what happens
876 2013-03-08 03:24:05 <gmaxwell> warren: This is a really boring undergrad nash equlibrium question. It's not hard. Yes, they have an incentive to defect.
877 2013-03-08 03:24:13 <HM> 3 years is ancient for web tech.
878 2013-03-08 03:24:13 <warren> DP is exploiting network rules for personal gain. that's fine. Miners can equally exploit the rules to extract profit from DP.
879 2013-03-08 03:24:37 <warren> gmaxwell: what is the incentive? do they make more profit by defecting?
880 2013-03-08 03:24:39 <Vinnie_win> warren: Based on what gmaxwell said they are actually exploiting the low adoption level for gain
881 2013-03-08 03:24:46 <HM> you've built a decentralised system with incomplete rules, but it's big enough such that perfecting the rules is difficult
882 2013-03-08 03:24:53 <Vinnie_win> warren: A Bitcoin network at full utilization is not vulnerable to dp spam
883 2013-03-08 03:24:55 <warren> Vinnie_win: yes, that's what I've been saying.
884 2013-03-08 03:25:00 <gmaxwell> warren: yes. They pickup txn that they are otherwise rejecting.
885 2013-03-08 03:25:32 <HM> Vinnie_win: what is full utilisation?
886 2013-03-08 03:25:50 <warren> HM: # of users proportional to volume of transactions
887 2013-03-08 03:25:51 <Vinnie_win> HM: When there is sufficient transaction volume, it will not be economically viable for dp to send those losing tx
888 2013-03-08 03:26:15 <HM> huh
889 2013-03-08 03:26:22 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: sure it is, if joe flooder is willing to pay more per kilobyte, then he can have all the space. By some definition this is not vulnerable, but the resulting TXN fees may not be attractive.
890 2013-03-08 03:26:31 <HM> surely it's the ratio, not the absolute volume
891 2013-03-08 03:26:49 <warren> gmaxwell: Neither of us can be 100% certain in this prediction.
892 2013-03-08 03:27:02 <litropy> I'm about to use bgfminer. Where do I get my username, password, and coinbase address? I'm following the section labeled "Solo Mining" here: https://github.com/luke-jr/bfgminer
893 2013-03-08 03:27:14 <gmaxwell> warren: In any case do you see how the defection works yet? It's the same even if the blocks are full.
894 2013-03-08 03:27:39 <gmaxwell> litropy: from your bitcoin.conf for the first two, the last is just what address you want paid.
895 2013-03-08 03:27:54 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: I haven't thought about it hard but I suspect that if someone is willing to spend money they can always produce transactions that we would find objectionable but can never be filtered or pressured to stop
896 2013-03-08 03:28:04 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: agreed.
897 2013-03-08 03:28:16 <warren> gmaxwell: yes, some will defect. Given the optimal design of <factors> we can minimize defection. We don't need 100% compliance for this to work.
898 2013-03-08 03:28:19 <litropy> gmaxwell, I don't know what address I want paid. Never had one.
899 2013-03-08 03:28:28 <gmaxwell> warren: Say the blocks are full. A polluting txn shows up that pays enough fee that on a per fee/kb basis its better than some txn you were previously going to include.
900 2013-03-08 03:28:45 <gmaxwell> litropy: getnewaddress (hit the button or the rpc command) in the client. Be sure to backup your wallet.
901 2013-03-08 03:28:46 <CodeShark> litropy: set up a wallet and generate an address
902 2013-03-08 03:29:13 <gmaxwell> warren: As soon as one defects then there will be an incentive for more to effect. The system is only stable when all defect.
903 2013-03-08 03:29:32 <warren> gmaxwell: your scenario assumes the majority defect such that DP isn't forced to pay the higher pollution rate, my scenario assumes the majority of miners collude to maximize profit.
904 2013-03-08 03:29:52 <gmaxwell> warren: they can't effectively collude because they can costlessly defect.
905 2013-03-08 03:29:53 <litropy> gmaxwell, my bitcoin.conf only has the password. "rpcpassword=[deleted]"
906 2013-03-08 03:30:13 <HM> My choice is do nothing
907 2013-03-08 03:30:17 <gmaxwell> litropy: add a rpcuser=whatever (doesn't matter) and then you have a username too. :P
908 2013-03-08 03:30:22 <HM> If Bitcoin is truly valuable then people will pay the higher fees
909 2013-03-08 03:30:34 <litropy> gmaxwell, I imagine I need to be synced to generate an address?
910 2013-03-08 03:30:48 <gmaxwell> litropy: no, you can generate an address whenever.. though you must be synced to mine.
911 2013-03-08 03:30:48 <HM> People are going to have to compete on fees one day anyway, may as well be today
912 2013-03-08 03:30:59 <warren> litropy: you are in the wrong channel to ask about mining.
913 2013-03-08 03:31:03 <CodeShark> HM: the problem is that right now it doesn't have very high adoption - and it will only become valuable if it has higher adoption - and higher fees will make higher adoption harder to attain
914 2013-03-08 03:31:06 <Vinnie_win> HM: No, that's the problem, its too early in Bitcoin's adoption cycle to demand higher fees
915 2013-03-08 03:31:09 <litropy> warren, please direct me.
916 2013-03-08 03:31:28 <gmaxwell> HM: sure. I think I've said a bunch of times that I don't know how terrible an issue that part is.. the burning startup capital (including the delay to fee competion) sucks though.
917 2013-03-08 03:31:36 <Luke-Jr> litropy: what ASIC do you have btw?
918 2013-03-08 03:31:38 <warren> litropy: it appears that #bfgminer has lots of people. you could also try #bitcoin and others.
919 2013-03-08 03:31:53 <warren> litropy: I would recommend blockchain.info for a very easy to use, reasonably secure wallet
920 2013-03-08 03:31:54 <litropy> Luke-Jr, ASIC?
921 2013-03-08 03:31:58 <gmaxwell> litropy: #bitcoin-mining but your questions are fine here..
922 2013-03-08 03:32:18 <warren> gmaxwell: oh, didn't realize that was on topic here.
923 2013-03-08 03:32:51 <gmaxwell> I would catagorically not recommend blockchain.info. It's a centerally controlled service which has previously been deceptive about their privacy politics and compromised their users privacy for private gain.
924 2013-03-08 03:33:01 <Vinnie_win> I made an appeal to piuk to drop dp direct gambling links from blockchain.info
925 2013-03-08 03:33:09 <warren> gmaxwell: oh? damn.
926 2013-03-08 03:33:12 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: blockchain.info is great for read-only wallets
927 2013-03-08 03:33:17 <gmaxwell> (wrt the memory dealers thing and disclosing the identity of a b.i user to pressure them to make good on their trade)
928 2013-03-08 03:33:41 <litropy> gmaxwell, when I click, Address Book, and then click, New Address, the Address field is blank. I assume that's just for adding a recipient whom already has an address.
929 2013-03-08 03:34:16 <HM> i have some funds in b.i.
930 2013-03-08 03:34:33 <HM> it was just convenient, and i needed the coins quickly
931 2013-03-08 03:35:04 <warren> gmaxwell: OK, I get your argument now about defection. I don't think it can be proven that I'm wrong, but I can't prove that I'm correct in the collusion theory either. I suppose it is unfortunate that the non-constant behavioral costs were not anticipated in the original design.
932 2013-03-08 03:35:06 <gmaxwell> litropy: right.
933 2013-03-08 03:35:34 <gmaxwell> warren: I con't prove that it wouldn't work in practice. defaults have a lot of inertia. But it doesn't work in theory. :P
934 2013-03-08 03:35:42 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: okay so, as of now the only 2 viable options are 1) do nothing and 2) soft fork drop blocks with out<fee ?
935 2013-03-08 03:36:04 <warren> gmaxwell: collusion vs. defection would have some non-technical tipping point.
936 2013-03-08 03:36:26 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: the out<fee needs a lot more thought, but it could just become a default without a soft fork. The soft fork would only be needed to prevent defection which may not be needed.
937 2013-03-08 03:36:38 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: certantly the soft fork would be a lot more controversial and technically risky.
938 2013-03-08 03:36:51 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: I dont understand what you mean about become a default
939 2013-03-08 03:37:40 <gmaxwell> Vinnie_win: I mean we could release software that behaves that way but doesn't require blocks abide by it.. e.g. won't make a block breaking that rule. It could be the case that everyone just runs it.
940 2013-03-08 03:38:01 <gmaxwell> certantly making it a rule is a lot easier if almost everyone is already doing it.
941 2013-03-08 03:38:04 <HM> wow just imagine what shit we'd be in if Bitcoin needed to handle more than 1 transaction per second
942 2013-03-08 03:38:04 <litropy> So, could I just use https://www.bitaddress.org, copy that, then put it here: --coinbase-addr [myaddress]
943 2013-03-08 03:38:21 <warren> gmaxwell: can we fold in any of the other pollution costs into this?
944 2013-03-08 03:38:29 <gmaxwell> litropy: yep. though hopefully that page isn't logging your key. make sure you save the key.
945 2013-03-08 03:38:45 <gmaxwell> warren: No. Vinnie's metric had the advantage of being parameter free.
946 2013-03-08 03:38:55 <warren> oh... good
947 2013-03-08 03:39:03 <litropy> gmaxwell, what's the safes way to get an address?
948 2013-03-08 03:39:13 <litropy> safest*
949 2013-03-08 03:39:25 <gmaxwell> litropy: use the new address button, then backup the wallet.
950 2013-03-08 03:39:32 <CodeShark> litropy: if you really want to take matters into your own hands, I would recommend setting up your own wallet
951 2013-03-08 03:39:42 <gmaxwell> CodeShark: the dude is solo mining. :P
952 2013-03-08 03:39:50 <CodeShark> oh, hmmm
953 2013-03-08 03:39:58 <CodeShark> ASIC? :)
954 2013-03-08 03:40:46 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: When you say release software that behaves that way but doesn't require blocks abide by it, what you mean is a "soft limit", i.e. something miners could easily comment out. Which would be the equivalent of defecting.
955 2013-03-08 03:40:55 <CodeShark> I tried solo CPU mining and was moderately successful, gmaxwell...on testnet :p
956 2013-03-08 03:41:01 <Vinnie_win> gmaxwell: This change would only affect mining